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OBERGEFELL, FISHER, AND THE INVERSION OF TIERS
Maxwell L. Stearns*
ABSTRACT
In striking the ban on same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court avoided tiers of
scrutiny, thus declining to apply rational basis in a non-deferential manner as it had in other cases involving
sexual orientation. After signaling its growing discomfort with the deferential Grutter v. Bollinger strict
scrutiny formulation in the Fisher I remand and the Fisher II oral argument, the Fisher v. University of
Texas (Fisher II) majority embraced that very analysis to sustain the Texas affirmative action program. And
although the Court claims to apply intermediate scrutiny in gender-based equal protection cases, the cases devolve
to de facto applications of strict scrutiny or rational basis, based on whether the Court claims a real-sex
difference or an overbroad gender-based generalization.
The tiers-of-scrutiny doctrine has evolved from two to three formal tiers, yet a closer reading suggests five applied
tiers. As a basis for prediction, the tiers are inverted, producing the following counterintuitive sequence: strict
scrutiny, rational basis plus, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny lite, and rational basis. The result has been
doctrinal confusion, a lack of predictability, and pleas for abandonment or fundamental reform.
This Article’s theoretical account explains why tiers of scrutiny should not be jettisoned and why the existing
scheme, as applied to race, sexual orientation, and gender, has produced anomalous—perhaps even
disingenuous—applications. It further demonstrates how a modest reconceptualization operating within the
general framework of existing tiers can greatly simplify applications, avoid the most critical anomalies, and
thereby improve doctrinal predictability and coherence.
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INTRODUCTION
Following oral arguments in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the dominant media
account was that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had eviscerated arguments
against same-sex marriage. Observers claimed that Justice Ginsburg had
established the absence of plausible arguments that same-sex marriage
would undermine opposite-sex marriage, would other than benefit children
raised by committed same-sex partners, or would otherwise compromise
social mores.2 Although Justice Kennedy began his questioning with a
seemingly ahistorical claim that our current definition of marriage, limited
to monogamous opposite-sex unions, had persisted for the ages,3 he soon
reclaimed his earlier voice, linking respect for same-sex unions to the dignity of committed partners.4 The general impression was a fait accompli in
which a majority would dismiss same-sex marriage bans with comparable
dispatch to that given anti-miscegenation laws in the landmark 1967 decision, Loving v. Virginia.5
While this account provided same-sex marriage proponents grounds to
celebrate, a nagging doubt persisted. Before oral argument, Obergefell’s dominant framing sounded in equal protection: were same-sex partners denied access to marriage victims of a constitutionally prohibited distinction? In this
framing, the issue was not the merits of same-sex marriage bans; rather, it was
how to classify persons denied access to marriage due to sexual orientation
and how to assess same-sex marriage bans based on the selected classification.
The elephant in the room—the chosen tier of scrutiny—was largely ignored in oral argument and was further AWOL6 in media commentary.
On the issue of tiers, Justice Anthony Kennedy, whose vote, most predict1
2

3

4
5
6

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Scott Lemieux, Same-Sex Marriage Opponents Sounded Desperate in Court. They Should Be, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/28/same-sex-marriageopponents-desperate-supreme-court; Inae Oh, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Shuts Down Gay-Marriage Challengers,
MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2015/04/ruth-baderginsburg-shuts-down-gay-marriage-challengers (focusing on questioning by Justice Ginsburg and including discussion of other Justices).
Transcript of Question 1 Oral Argument at 6–7, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(No. 14–556) (“This definition has been with us for millennia.”); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at
2594 (“The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations.”). But see id. at 2595 (“The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. That institution—even as confined to opposite-sex
relations—has evolved over time.”); id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Indeed, from the
standpoint of history and tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is
much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in some
cultures around the world.”). For a more detailed analysis of Obergefell, see infra Part III.C.
See Transcript of Question 1 Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 72–73; see also U.S. v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (discussing the dignity of marriage).
388 U.S. 1 (1967). The story behind the case is now told in a feature length motion picture. See
LOVING (Raindog Films & Big Beach Films 2016).
Absent without Leave.

1046

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:5

ed, would control the case outcome, appeared to have squeezed himself into a doctrinal box.7 The choice of tier often controls the fate of equal protection claims. Even when it does not, it influences how the analysis is
framed.8 For Justice Kennedy, the problem seemed less about the outcome
than the framing. Although he seemed likely to vote against the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans, the challenge was avoiding casting aspersions on those who embraced a more traditional view of marriage.
The traditional framing of tiers was binary: rational basis review or
strict scrutiny. Those who identified a suspect class or fundamental right
received the benefit of strict scrutiny, which was almost invariably fatal for
the challenged law. Those who did not were left with rational basis review,
the default tier, which typically sustained the challenged law. The relatively
more recent third tier, intermediate scrutiny, although harder to predict,
was largely limited to gender-based distinctions.9
Even the three-tier scheme is misleading. A closer inspection suggests five
categories that can be expressed in a linear sequence. The left-most position
corresponds to the greatest likelihood of sustaining the challenged law,
whereas the right-most position corresponds to the greatest likelihood of having the challenged law struck down. Immediately to the right of the relaxed
rational basis test is its somewhat more demanding form, “rational basis plus”
or “with teeth.” Immediately to the left of the stringent strict scrutiny test is
its correspondingly more lenient form, “strict scrutiny lite.” Intermediate
scrutiny falls between the two modified tests, producing the following scheme:

7

8
9

In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s presidential victory, it is no longer certain that Justice Kennedy will remain the median jurist. Neil Gorsuch has been confirmed to replace Justice Antonin
Scalia, and his appointment is not expected to affect the overall composition of the Court from
an ideological perspective. Lisa Marshall Manheim, Opinion, The Gorsuch Fight Changed the Senate.
Will It Change the Court?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/08/opinion/the-gorsuch-fight-changed-the-senate-will-it-change-the-court.html?_r=0. An appointment that would replace one of the more senior remaining jurists, however, could have the effect
of changing that composition in a more predictably conservative direction. Peter Baker, Picking
One Justice, Trump Has Eye on Choosing a Second, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/trump-supreme-court-neil-gorsuch.html
(explaining that Justice Kennedy is “the swing vote who holds the balance of power on the court”
and discussing the significant impact President Trump could have on the direction of the Supreme Court if a second seat were to open if Justice Kennedy were to retire); LEE EPSTEIN ET
AL., PRESIDENT-ELECT TRUMP AND HIS POSSIBLE JUSTICES (2016), available at
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/PossibleTrumpJustices.pdf (considering how President
Trump’s possible future nominees could shape the Supreme Court).
For an analysis of the Court’s often creative workarounds the tiers of scrutiny, see infra Part I.C.
For a more in-depth explanation of the development of the tiers of scrutiny, see infra Part I.
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TABLE 1
TIERS OF SCRUTINY IN ONE DIMENSION
(1) Rational
Basis

(2) Rational
Basis Plus

(3) Intermediate

(4) Strict
(5) Strict
Scrutiny Lite
Scrutiny

Lax Review

Stringent Review

Although this scheme tracks black letter law, with “rational basis plus,”
a somewhat more demanding form of rational basis review, and “strict
scrutiny lite,” a somewhat less stringent form of strict scrutiny, it is far less
helpful in predicting case outcomes.10 When the Supreme Court employs
rational basis plus, it typically strikes down the challenged law, and when it
employs strict scrutiny lite, it typically sustains the challenged law. The
anomalies involve two categories. The first is race-based affirmative action,
where despite applying strict scrutiny, the Court sustains the challenged
law. The second involves animus against politically unpopular groups,
where despite applying rational basis, the Court strikes down the challenged law. From a predictive perspective, therefore, the tiers have been
inverted, with strict scrutiny lite abutting rational basis and with both of
those tests sustaining challenged laws, and with rational basis plus abutting
strict scrutiny and with both of those tests striking challenged laws. The
anomalous sequence, 14325, is presented in Table 2:
TABLE 2
TIERS OF SCRUTINY RECAST
(1) Rational (4) Strict
(2) Rational
(5) Strict
(3) Intermediate
Basis
Scrutiny Lite
Basis Plus
Scrutiny
More Likely to Sustain
More Likely to Strike

Affirmative action falls within Category 4.11 Given his past treatment of
cases implicating sexual minorities, some commentators anticipated that
Justice Kennedy would place same-sex marriage into Category 2, although
others argued for Category 3.12 Justice Kennedy took neither of these approaches and instead largely jettisoned equal protection analysis in favor of

10
11
12

For a detailed presentation of the relevant cases, see infra Part I.C., and cites therein.
See infra Part I.C.1.
See infra Part III.C.
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an alternative due process approach.13 This Article will explain this important doctrinal move, as part of a broader inquiry into the tiers of scrutiny framework. The analysis will also explain how the tiers doctrine has
created anomalies associated with affirmative action, same-sex marriage,
and gender-based classifications, and how the Court could simplify its applications without abandoning the essential doctrinal framework.
The analytical difficulty that generates this peculiar doctrinal progression involves dimensionality. Dimensions are normative scales of measurement used to evaluate virtually anything that is being compared. Dimensionality studies normative measures and how they interrelate. People
routinely evaluate information along analytical dimensions. Some dimensions involve simple binaries—black versus white, male versus female—
although as used to sort individuals, such simple schemes sometimes fail.14
Other scales are more nuanced, for example, continuous gradations of
height or weight. People often combine multiple criteria along a single dimension. Larger objects tend to be heavier, allowing us to rank modes of
transportation—a scooter, a bicycle, a car—in a sequence that captures
both size and weight. Sometimes combined alignments break down. Adding a hot air balloon—larger than a car yet lighter than a scooter—forces
the need to split the dimensions of size (scooter, bicycle, car, then hot air balloon) and weight (hot air balloon then scooter, bicycle, car).15
Equal protection implicates important constitutional values that can also
be cast along analytical dimensions. These include degrees of invidiousness
of challenged classifications or the relative importance of claimed fundamental rights. These evaluative criteria often align neatly with a simple analytical
dimension captured by tiers of scrutiny. Some cases, however, like inflated
hot air balloons, disrupt our assumptions about common measurement
scales. The problem with the tiers of scrutiny scheme is not the absolute
number of tiers. With relatively minor adjustments, the formal three-tier
scheme works well. Rather, the difficulty is failing to appreciate how the tiers
implicate the dimensionality of the laws subject to constitutional challenge.
This Article simplifies the tiers analysis and explains why affirmative action
and same-sex marriage are constitutional hot air balloons. The analysis establishes three main points about tiers of scrutiny. First, for historical reasons,16
equal protection cases involving race implicate two dimensions, thereby also

13
14

15
16

Id.
See, e.g., Julie Scelfo, A University Recognizes a Third Gender: Neutral, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/education/edlife/a-university-recognizes-a-thirdgender-neutral.html?_r=0 (discussing university response to student who identifies with neither
conventional gender and who favors the neutral pronoun, “they”).
The rankings assume the hot air balloon is aloft. For an introduction of dimensionality and related concepts, see Part II, and cites therein.
See infra Part II.E.
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implicating a third tier of scrutiny or forcing a counterintuitive application of
strict scrutiny if such laws are sustained. Second, although the Supreme Court
applies intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications, the cases implicate a
single dimension, thus allowing for a simpler two-tier scheme. Third, the
Obergefell Court’s reliance on due process as the principal basis for striking
same-sex marriage bans, coupled with its avoidance of tiers of scrutiny analysis, reflects a failure to appreciate the case’s underlying dimensionality.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of tiers of
scrutiny. In reviewing the existing scheme, this Part considers the doctrinal
anomalies and various alternatives suggested by jurists and scholars. Part II
presents the dimensionality framework. That Part demonstrates how the
traditional two-tier system properly handles an infinite array of classifications
assessed along a single dimension, and conversely, how as small a sampling as
three cases can implicate multiple dimensions, thereby thwarting a two-tier
scheme. Part III relates this analysis to equal protection cases involving race,
gender, and sexual orientation. The analysis demonstrates how dimensionality explains the inversion of tiers, and it explains how to simplify outcomes
while also improving our understanding of the case law. The Article concludes with a cheat sheet to help translate the Supreme Court’s often misleading claims about its choice of tiers into the tiers it actually applies.
I. THE PROBLEM OF TIERS
To assess the sometimes confusing state of the tiers of scrutiny doctrine,
we first review the functions that the scheme serves.
A. Those Who Dichotomize . . . and Those Who Don’t17
Professor Michael Klarman has identified McLaughlin v. Florida,18 involving a ban on interracial cohabitation, as the first Supreme Court case applying strict scrutiny to strike down an invidious race-based classification.19
The conventional understanding is clear: strict scrutiny is almost always fatal to adverse racial classifications. More recently, the Court has applied
this test to laws intended to benefit African Americans. With notable exceptions that include Grutter v. Bollinger,20 which sustained the University of
17

18
19

20

Although often expressed as, “There are two kinds of people in the world, those who dichotomize
and those who don’t,” the actual quotation is: “There may be said to be two classes of people in
the world; those who constantly divide the people of the world into two classes, and those who do
not.” ROBERT C. BENCHLEY, The Most Popular Book of the Month, in OF ALL THINGS 187 (1921).
379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 255
(1991). The Supreme Court planted the seed for two levels of scrutiny arguably as early as The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 81 (1873), which distinguished claims arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment based on race from those implicating other, purely economic, interests.
539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003).
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Michigan Law School affirmative action program, and Fisher v. University of
Texas (Fisher II),21 which sustained the University of Texas affirmative action program, the result has generally been to strike such racial preferences
down.22 As a doctrinal matter, lower federal courts are expected to subject
all express racial classifications, whether intended to harm or to help African Americans, to the two-part strict scrutiny test under which they are
presumed invalid.
Strict scrutiny demands that the government prove that the chosen classification serves a compelling governmental interest and that the selected
means are narrowly tailored to further that interest.23 The two critical features of this test are, first, that the burden is placed on the government once
the claimant identifies the trigger for strict scrutiny, and second, that the
test can be overcome if two conditions—a compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring—are satisfied. In conventional tiers of scrutiny
analysis, strict scrutiny is the exception; rational basis is the rule. To apply
strict scrutiny, and thus to place the burden on the state to defend its laws,
the challenger must put forth a specific justification. Typically, the justificatory trigger takes the form of an illicit classification, with race serving as the
paradigmatic example,24 or a fundamental right, for example, the right to
use contraceptives,25 or to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, at least prior
to viability.26 Absent such a trigger, the presumptive, or baseline, level of
21
22

23

24

25

26

136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016).
This was, for example, true of Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003). For a discussion of cases treating race-based preferences under intermediate scrutiny, see Part I.C.1. Exceptions to this
rule have been overturned, see Part I.C.1, or, in the case of Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271 (1978), largely incorporated into Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). For a discussion of the case sequence leading to Fisher II, see Part II.F.2.a.
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[Suspect] classifications
are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”).
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“[C]lassifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”)
(citations omitted).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding that married and unmarried couples must
have the same right to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(holding that a law that outright prohibits, rather than regulates, the use of contraceptives was
unconstitutional).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), the Supreme Court downgraded abortion from a fundamental right to a liberty
interest, and in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), it sustained a late-term, partial-birth
abortion ban that did not include a maternal-health exception. In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), the Supreme Court applied a more stringent version of the undue
burden test to strike down two provisions of a Texas law that limited access to abortions by requiring physician-admitting privileges at local hospitals and by restricting abortions to facilities
upgraded to match those of a surgical center, the combined effect of which placed women of reproductive age, in many instances, several hundred miles away from the nearest abortion facility.
These cases exemplify drawing a line along the dimension of weak-to-strong abortion rights, separating procedures, or access to facilities, that are or are not protected. See infra Part III.
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scrutiny—rational basis—applies.
Unlike strict scrutiny, rational basis leaves the burden of proof on the
challenger, who, to have a law struck down, must demonstrate the absence
of a legitimate governmental interest or of means that rationally further that
interest.27 Under traditional rational basis review, or the straight-face test,
nearly any purpose counts as legitimate provided that one can articulate it
without physically belying sincerity. As demonstrated below, this is no
longer literally true,28 although it is most obviously so in the Court’s unerring acceptance of creative defenses to special interest legislation masqueraded as furthering the public interest.29
The basic two-tiered scheme—strict scrutiny and rational basis scrutiny—is most easily understood as operating in two sequential stages. Imagine two bins atop an otherwise empty desk, one marked “presumptively bad
laws” and the other marked “presumptively good laws.” Stage one is the
initial rough sort, meaning the placement of cases into their respective bins.
When a justificatory trigger is present, place the case in the bin marked presumptively bad laws. This means that strict scrutiny applies and that the
challenged law is far more likely than not to be struck down. Alternatively,
absent a justificatory trigger, place the case in the bin marked presumptively good laws. This means that rational basis scrutiny applies and that the
challenged law is far more likely than not to be sustained.
Although preliminary, stage one is profoundly important. Many constitutional cases involve disputed factual characterizations that produce a kind
of analytical gray zone. When this occurs, whoever bears the burden of
proof—the state trying to defend its law against strict scrutiny or the challenger trying to invalidate a law under rational basis review—will lose, rendering the initial sort decisive.
To illustrate, imagine that a state legislature reapportions its congressional
districts following a decennial census. The legislators know that doing so will
affect the racial composition of its districts, for example concentrating African-American voters within minority-majority districts or, conversely, dispersing them across multiple majority-white districts, thus risking defeat of a

27

28
29

See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (“[U]nless . . . it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.”).
See infra Part I.C.2.
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (sustaining under rational basis
scrutiny a law requiring optometrists or ophthalmologists to write prescriptions before opticians
could fit new lenses onto old frames despite apparent motivation to benefit favored healthcare
professionals); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (sustaining under
rational basis scrutiny a ban on filled milk as an adulterated product despite its availability as a
safe dairy alternative between fresh milk deliveries prior to commonplace refrigeration in rural
communities, thereby benefitting the fresh milk industry).
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representative from the minority demographic group.30 Further assume,
however, that the actual redistricting goals are two-fold: first, to protect a
nonminority functional incumbent, meaning a sitting representative serving a
district that will no longer exist in its present form following reapportionment,
and second, to avoid violating the non-retrogression principle under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).31 If the government must prove that the
prohibited factor, race, did not control its redistricting, it will lose because it
relied on multiple considerations, and it is impossible to disprove controlling
reliance on the single factor of race. Conversely, if the challenger must disprove that the legislature was predominantly motivated by the non-racial factor of protecting a functional incumbent, she will lose for the same reason.
When the legislature is motivated by several factors, a subset of which are
impermissible, whoever bears the burden of proof—meaning whoever is
called upon to prove the negative—will fail. In such cases, the rough sort,
meaning the initial bin placement, controls the outcome.
Stage two involves fine sorting. This means going through each bin—
the presumptive goods and the presumptive bads—to locate mistakes. Mistakes take the form of cases whose early sort proved misleading as to the
eventual outcome. For those cases initially consigned to the strict scrutiny
pile (presumptive bads), the challenged law will still survive if the state can
prove that it was enacted to advance a compelling governmental interest
and that the means chosen were narrowly tailored to further that interest.
Conversely, for cases consigned to the rational basis pile (presumptive
goods), the challenger will still prevail if she can demonstrate the absence of
a legitimate governmental interest or of means that rationally further that
interest. The strict scrutiny test is conjunctive: the state must prove both a
compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring for the law to survive. And the rational basis test is disjunctive: the challenger need only
prove the absence of either a legitimate governmental interest or of means
rationally in furtherance of that interest, to have the law struck down.
B. Running with the Red Queen
“Well, in our country,” said Alice, still panting a little, “you’d generally get to
somewhere else—if you ran very fast for a long time as we’ve been doing.”
“A slow sort of country!” said the Queen. “Now, here, you see, it takes all the
running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere

30

31

Cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006) (holding that the redrawing of lines in District 23 to dilute the influence of Latino voters violated the Voting Rights
Act).
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012). For a hypothetical based on Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013), which limited the force of the preclearance provision under this Act, see text accompanying notes 34–38.
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else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”32

The two-stage sorting system raises an obvious question: if stage-one
sorting results from factors that correlate to either good or bad laws, why
bother with stage two? Laws are enacted as part of a continuous dynamic
process and with knowledge of the very rules used to classify them. Law
making is therefore a Red Queen game in which the judiciary devises rules
in response to problematic laws; legislators enact responsive laws furthering
similar objectives while evading detection under existing rules; the judiciary
refines its rules to locate and strike the refined problematic laws; and so on.33
Consider, for example, a revised apportionment hypothetical inspired
by Shelby County v. Holder.34 In Shelby County, the Court invalidated the ongoing application of § 4 of the VRA, which set out the formula for applying
the preclearance provision in § 5 to covered jurisdictions.35 Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, reasoned that since the law’s original enactment, southern states had a better record of minority voter turnout than
their northern counterparts.36 Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that the
observed improvement followed the continuous evolution of legal responses
to constantly changing discriminatory practices. She explained: “Early attempts to cope with this vile infection resembled battling the Hydra.
Whenever one form of voting discrimination was identified and prohibited,
others sprang up in its place.”37
To illustrate Justice Ginsburg’s intuition, imagine that an early legislature elected by voters with abhorrent views concerning race produced voting districts relying on express racial criteria to make electing a black candidate implausible. After expressly identifying particular neighborhoods as
black or white, the legislature imposed a blanket rule preventing qualified
voters in black neighborhoods from forming a majority within any single
district. Now assume that in a proper constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court construes the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause to invalidate this scheme. The Court holds that a state cannot rely
on express racial criteria to apportion voting districts so as to undermine
minority-voter efforts to elect a representative of their own race. The ruling
signals that express racial classifications that undermine the interests of African-American voters will be placed in the presumptive bad bin, to which
strict scrutiny applies, and will almost certainly be struck down.

32
33
34
35
36
37

LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 42
(Macmillan Company 1928) (1871).
For a discussion of Red Queen games in evolutionary biology, see generally MATT RIDLEY, THE
RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1993).
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
Id. at 2631.
Id. at 2625–26.
Id. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Assume that the state legislature remains undeterred. To accomplish its
objective, it relies on demographic criteria that meaningfully correlate to
race—zip codes, income data, party registration, and proximity to identified community organizations or churches—with the same effect of dividing
black voters as minorities across predominantly white voting districts. Because this regime is nominally race neutral, it would be sorted initially into
the presumptive good bin. To avoid the end run around its prior rule, the
Court might hold that despite the initial sorting, when a law’s purpose and
effect is to prevent minority voters from electing as their representative a
member of their own race, it fails rational basis scrutiny. Going forward,
the Court might declare that race cases meeting its newly minted “purposeand-effects test” will be subject to strict scrutiny, and thus sorted into the
presumptive bad bin. The game, of course, will continue.38 The legislature
might, for example, expressly articulate or otherwise signal a primary purpose of protecting the functional incumbency of a non-minority representative, thus claiming to justify a similar scheme in spite of, rather than because of, any adverse consequence to African-American voters.
Fine sorting allows the judiciary to search beyond its initial classification
(express use of race is presumptively bad), or even its later more refined initial sorting (racially neutral laws with the purpose and effect of adversely affecting African Americans are presumptively bad). Neutral classifications
can mask illicit purposes. Conversely, non-neutral laws can be coupled
with benign motivations. The Court’s two-part test helps to locate laws that
would readily slip past its inevitably overbroad initial sort, winding up in a
pile for which the presumptive outcome should not control.
C. Getting Beyond the Basic Tiers
The Supreme Court has decided several prominent cases in a manner
that thwarts the basic two-tier scheme. Most notably, it has used strict scrutiny to sustain express racial preferences in higher education; before Obergefell, it used rational basis scrutiny to strike down laws implicating the rights
of sexual minorities; and it has employed a third tier, most notably in the
context of gender, or sex-based, classifications. We now consider these doctrinal maneuvers.
38

For another illustration, see Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
In Schuette, the Supreme Court sustained a Michigan referendum ending racial preferences in
state institutions of higher learning against an equal protection challenge based on the political
participation doctrine. The debate over the merits of the doctrine between Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, and Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, reflected a Red Queen Game, with
Justice Scalia lamenting the apparent evolving standards on which the doctrine rests, see id. at
1641–42, and with Justice Sotomayor maintaining that the evolving standards reflect an ongoing
game of judicial decisions invalidating strategies undermining racial progress, revised strategies
that circumvent those rulings, updated judicial responses, and so on, see id. at 1652, 1654–59.
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1. Strict in Theory but Not Fatal (or Feeble?) in Fact
Although the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to any law that
draws an express racial classification, whether intended to harm or to benefit minorities, this is a fairly recent doctrinal development. In the landmark
1978 case, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,39 Justice Powell issued
the controlling opinion, the relevant parts of which no one else joined. Justice Powell argued for strict scrutiny in race-based affirmative action cases,
but concluded that the interest in diversity in higher education was compelling.40 He further determined, however, that the medical school’s reliance
on a racial quota—setting aside sixteen out of one hundred seats for specified minorities—failed narrow tailoring.41 Justice Brennan, writing separately, argued that benign race-based classifications should be subject to intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny. Under conventional
intermediate scrutiny, a challenged law will survive provided that there is
an important governmental interest and that the selected means substantially further that interest.42 Writing separately, Justice Stevens construed Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ban the use of race in admissions.43
The combined opinions rendered Justice Powell’s opinion controlling under
the narrowest grounds rule.44
Two years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, Justice Burger wrote a controlling plurality opinion applying intermediate scrutiny to sustain a federal
program benefitting contractors who formed, or who employed, a minoritybusiness enterprise (“MBE”). 45 In the 1989 case, City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.,46 Justice O’Connor distinguished Fullilove, applying strict scrutiny
to strike down a structurally parallel program benefitting minority businesses contracting for work performed for the City of Richmond, Virginia. Justice O’Connor observed that whereas the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to regulate matters affecting race, the same amendment
39
40
41
42

43
44

45
46

438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In more recent gender-based cases, the Supreme Court has vacillated on who bears the burden of proof and
on how the test is constructed. For a discussion of later doctrinal tweaks to intermediate scrutiny,
see infra Part III.B.
438 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The narrowest grounds doctrine selects that opinion consistent with the outcome that has the
least impact on the law. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that when
“no single rationale enjoys the assent of five Justices,” the Court’s holding is “‘that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds’”) (citation omitted); see also MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS
OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 130–33 (2000) (analyzing Bakke under the Marks narrowest grounds doctrine).
448 U.S. 448, 454, 491 (1980).
488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989).
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stripped such power from state and local governments.47 One year later, in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,48 Justice Brennan, for the first time, commanded majority support in applying intermediate scrutiny to sustain a racial preference for the issuance of broadcast licenses as applied to a challenge pursuant to the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause.49
Justice Brennan’s victory was short-lived. In the landmark 1995 decision,
Adarand Constructors v. Pena,50 Justice O’Connor, writing for a majority, struck
down a federal MBE set-aside program under strict scrutiny, thus overturning
Metro Broadcasting.51 Rejecting a broader position expressed in Justice Scalia’s
concurrence that would ban virtually all use of race, Justice O’Connor, writing a majority opinion that Justice Scalia nonetheless joined,52 reiterated her
earlier refutation of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s claim that “strict in theory
[is] fatal in fact.”53 Up to and including Adarand, Justice O’Connor had never
voted to sustain a benign use of race,54 raising the question as to what motivated Justice O’Connor to insist that as applied to race, strict scrutiny is somehow not fatal. As was borne out eight years later, the critical remaining case
involved affirmative action in higher education.55 In what Justice Scalia described as the “split double header”56—Grutter v. Bollinger57 and Gratz v. Bollinger58—the simmering dispute over race-based affirmative action between
Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia suddenly boiled.
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor essentially afforded Justice Powell’s controlling Bakke analysis majority-opinion status.59 Although Gratz held that the
47
48
49

50
51
52

53

54

55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 490–91.
497 U.S. 547, 564–66 (1990).
See id. at 564–65 (“We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress . . . are
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Id. at 227.
For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s apparently reluctant strategy in joining the majority opinion,
see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional
Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 334–35 (2000).
Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that
strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”), with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (“Finally, we
wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”).
Michael Klarman, Are Landmark Court Decisions All That Important?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.:
CHRON. REV. (Aug. 8, 2003), http://chronicle.com/article/Are-Landmark-CourtDecisions/7437 (“Before Grutter, [Justice O’Connor] had never voted to sustain a race-based affirmative-action plan, though she had explicitly noted that such policies might be acceptable under certain stringent conditions.”).
See id. (“Grutter reveals that O’Connor probably changed her mind about affirmative action over
the past two decades.”).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323.
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University of Michigan could not use a race-based point system for its undergraduate admissions with a substantial specified allocation for minority
applicants,60 Grutter held that the law school could give added weight to race
as part of a holistic admissions process that treated each applicant individually.61 The Court maintained this distinction despite data demonstrating
near-perfect precision in the ratio of minority-to-non-minority applicants,
on the one hand, and the ratio of admitted minority-to-non-minority students, on the other.62 Even though the university point system appeared to
formalize the functional algorithm operating within the law school admissions process on a smaller scale through the constant monitoring of daily
admissions reports, Justice O’Connor, like Justice Powell before her, insisted that the form the affirmative action process took mattered as much as, if
not more than, the substantive results obtained.
The more recent volley with the multi-staged University of Texas affirmative action program reveals the Court’s ongoing struggle with the
Powell-O’Connor doctrinal formulation, which Justice Kennedy eventually
adopted as his own. In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I),63 the
Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy writing, remanded a challenge to the
University of Texas affirmative action program, in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had applied the Grutter formulation to
uphold a combined top-ten-percent plan with a holistic race-based affirmative action overlay. The second phase was designed to ensure a critical
mass of minority students that included some who, although graduating below the automatic admission threshold, came from more competitive high
schools and had higher test scores.64 Although in Fisher I, he described the
Fifth Circuit’s approach as having rendered strict scrutiny “feeble,”65 writing for the majority in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II),66 Justice
Kennedy then affirmed the Fifth Circuit, which on remand had reinstated
its earlier ruling. In doing so, Justice Kennedy applied a version of strict
scrutiny that contravened his earlier call for a less deferential approach.
The combined cases demonstrate three points. First, in the context of
benign race-based preferences, the Court has abandoned intermediate
scrutiny in favor of strict scrutiny. Second, in the specific context of race60
61
62

63
64
65
66

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“But the correlation between the percentage of the Law
School’s pool of applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the percentage of
the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise to be dismissed
as merely the result of the school paying ‘some attention to [the] numbers.’”) (alteration in original).
133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). For a more detailed analysis of Fisher I, see infra Part II.F.2.b.
Id. at 2416.
Id. at 2421.
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
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based affirmative action in state institutions of higher learning, strict in theory is not fatal in fact, and the Supreme Court has struggled to ensure that
this does not render it feeble in fact. And third, wherever the non-fatalnon-feeble test lies, it is not intermediate scrutiny (Category 3).
2. Rational in Theory but Strict in Fact
Just as the Court has salvaged race-based affirmative action while nominally applying strict scrutiny, so too, leading into Obergefell, it had invalidated
laws adversely affecting sexual minorities while nominally applying rational
basis scrutiny.67 Recall that absent a justificatory trigger for strict scrutiny,
the Court applies rational basis scrutiny, under which it typically sustains the
challenged law.68 The line of cases testing this intuition involves claims of animus against politically unpopular groups. In USDA v. Moreno, the Court
struck down the denial of benefits under the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which
banned households with unrelated cohabitants from eligibility.69 The case
involved sympathetic plaintiffs, including the mother of a hearing-impaired
girl who had moved in with another woman on public assistance to provide
mutual financial support while the girl attended a specialized school.70
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, struck down this eligibility provision on the ground that it was premised on an animus against “‘hippies’ and
‘hippie communes.’”71 Justice Brennan held that it is never rational to exhibit
an animus against a politically unpopular group.72 Then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the law satisfied conventional rational basis
scrutiny by reducing the likelihood that cohabitants have come together for
the purpose of receiving public benefits, thereby reducing fraud.73
Although Justice Brennan rejoined that the statute contained separate anti-fraud provisions,74 under ordinary rational basis review, that would not
have mattered. The test requires no more than one legitimate governmental
interest and means that rationally further that interest. A set of cumulative
anti-fraud provisions within an elaborate public-welfare scheme would satisfy
that test. The only way to hold that the cohabitation provision was motivated by animus—an obviously illegitimate purpose—was to read out an other67
68
69
70
71
72

73

74

See infra Part III.C.
See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973).
Id. at 532.
Id. at 534.
Id. (“For if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must
at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”).
Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“This unit provides a guarantee which is not provided by
households containing unrelated individuals that the household exists for some purpose other
than to collect federal food stamps.”).
Id. at 536–37 (majority opinion).
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wise legitimate justification.75 But that is not standard rational basis review.
The Court extended its Moreno analysis in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center.76 In that case, a city denied a special-use permit that would have allowed an investor to convert a building into a home for adults with intellectual disabilities.77 The Court rejected several justifications for the denial,78
and it concluded instead that it was based on an illicit animus against such
persons, which, once more, was not a permissible basis in support of the
law.79 Again, however, this is not conventional rational basis review.
However problematic normatively, it is not irrational to imagine that
the permit denial resulted from community concerns that, if approved, the
plan would reduce property values. Preserving property values is not merely rational; it is a central function of local government. And this justification does not necessarily turn on animus. A group of residents could readily argue that although they wish that others in their community, or
potential purchasers, shared their unbiased views so that the proposed use
would not adversely affect local property values, the unfortunate contrary
reality explains their opposition.
To be sure, such arguments were rightly rejected in the context of restrictive covenants excluding, typically, African Americans and Jews. Defending such laws on the ground that blatant racial or religious restrictive
covenants preserve land values is no longer a credible legal position. But
rather than helping the Cleburne majority, this merely underscores the analytical difficulty. State-supported restrictions based on race or religion trigger strict scrutiny.80 Even an arguably rational, albeit disturbing, justification related to property values as the basis for racial or religious exclusions
thankfully will not suffice. Instead, the state would have to offer a compelling justification plus narrow tailoring. Preserving the value of real estate
through racial or religious bigotry easily fails this stringent test.
Despite these analytical difficulties, explaining the Court’s reliance on ra-

75

76
77

78

79
80

Accord Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945,
952 (2004) (“[I]n those few cases in which the Supreme Court has concluded that legislation subject to minimal scrutiny lacks a legitimate purpose, it has generally eschewed the search for any
conceivable hypothetical purpose and focused on what the Court views as the government’s actual purpose.”).
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 436–37. The once-common term “mental retardation” has been replaced with “intellectual
disability.” See Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010) (updating terminology in
federal statutes).
The expressed concerns included: negative attitudes of property owners to the project, fears of
elderly residents, concerns that students at the neighboring junior high school might harass residents, and location on a 500-year flood plain. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448–49.
Id. at 450.
The Supreme Court relied upon a bootstraping analysis, which deemed judicial enforecement of
private covenants state action, to render these devices constitutionally impermissible in Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
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tional basis scrutiny in this context is not difficult. In other contexts, for example, driving or being held responsible for contractual obligations, distinguishing those with intellectual disabilities from the general adult population
makes sense, as does the inclusion of cumulative anti-fraud provisions in a
welfare law. The animus analysis has the feature of a one-time ticket, invalidating each of the laws in question without calling the presumptive validity of
future laws, for example, those affecting persons with intellectual disabilities
or those imposing welfare-access restrictions, into question more generally.
The cases involving sexual minorities, discussed below, modify this analysis
in two important ways. First, the idea of a one-time ticket plays out differently
in the context of a body of case law that was largely designed to help forge a
path toward finding a constitutional right, here to same-sex marriage.81 Second, applying rational basis scrutiny while striking down a challenged law results in casting aspersions on those who disagree, or what Robert Nagel has
called judicial “name-calling,”82 a feature that appears to have contributed to
Justice Kennedy’s decision to rest Obergefell on an alternative ground.
In Romer v. Evans, the state of Colorado enacted Amendment 2 through a
statewide initiative.83 The Amendment prohibited sexual orientation, or other sexual-minority status, from inclusion in state or local antidiscrimination
laws.84 Prior to that Amendment, various localities had amended their antidiscrimination laws, which typically included categories such as race, religion,
and gender, to also include sexual orientation or other minority-sexual status.85 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Romer Court, struck down Amendment 2, relying principally on the Moreno and Cleburne animus rationales.86
In dissent, Justice Scalia maintained that because it was permissible to
criminalize same-sex intimacy—Romer was issued before Lawrence v. Texas
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick—it was also permissible to deny special benefits to individuals with a “self-avowed tendency or desire” to engage in such
intimacies.87 Justice Scalia further advanced a process-driven justification,
claiming it was not irrational in a multilevel democracy to take an issue
about which gays and lesbians had scored local victories in municipal lawmaking processes, and ratchet upward the decision-making level statewide
81

82

83
84
85
86
87

Maxwell L. Stearns, Private-Rights Adjudication and the Normative Foundations of Durable Constitutional
Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 77 (Christopher J. Peters ed.,
2013); Maxwell L. Stearns, Grains of Sand or Butterfly Effect: Standing, the Legitimacy of Precedent, and Reflections on Hollingsworth and Windsor, 65 ALA. L. REV. 349 (2013) [hereinafter Grains of Sand].
ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER: CENSORING OURSELVES
IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 124, 126 (1994) (positing that a “sinister description of ‘the proponents’”
proved relevant, perhaps necessary, to support the claim that the challenged law lacked a rational
basis). See infra Part III.C.
517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
Id. at 624.
Id. at 623–24.
Id. at 631–32.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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for ultimate resolution.88
In his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia relied in part on Bowers, a case that
Lawrence later overruled, to defend as rational the systematic exclusion of
minority sexual orientation from the list of protected statuses under state
and local antidiscrimination laws.89 After Romer, Lawrence struck down a
Texas consensual sodomy statute that, unlike the Georgia statute sustained
in Bowers, specifically targeted same-sex intimacy.90 Justice Kennedy once
again wrote the majority opinion, and, as in Romer, he declined to apply
strict scrutiny.91 Although Justice Kennedy’s choice of selected tier is imprecise, the more plausible reading supports rational basis.92 The Lawrence
Court thus further supported the doctrinal anomaly that rational in theory
can be strict, or even fatal, in fact.
The relationship between Romer, an equal protection case, and Lawrence,
a due process case, is especially important in light of the decision to rest
Obergefell primarily on due process grounds. In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that the historical analysis in the Bowers majority opinion was
deeply flawed, and that when sexual activity is not viewed as a series of isolated events, but rather as part of a defining bond between committed partners, it became evident that singling out the particular intimacy of consensual same-sex partners for criminality lacks a substantial justification.93 For
Justice Kennedy, this insight was essential in honoring the dignity of committed same-sex partners.
The Lawrence holding would have been more easily achieved had the
Court identified same-sex intimacy as a fundamental right triggering strict
scrutiny, as it had the right to birth control,94 and to terminate pre-viability
pregnancies.95 Justice Kennedy declined to do that, however, perhaps motivated by the desire to avoid forecasting a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Even so, Justice Scalia claimed that the Lawrence dignity analysis ren-

88

89
90
91
92

93
94
95

Id. at 639 (claiming a right to retain victories from lower levels in a multi-tiered democracy is
“unheard of”). Unlike in Moreno and Cleburne, where the rationales set aside under rational basis
review related to the merits, in Romer, the rationale set aside related to the process of enactment.
Id. at 640–41.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566, 578 (2002).
Id. at 578.
Although Justice Kennedy employed the term “substantial” at various points in his opinion, see,
for example, id. at 565; id. at 572, the overall opinion does not appear to rely on either intermediate or strict scrutiny. Most notably, Justice Kennedy did not refute Justice Scalia’s observation
that the majority had applied rational basis review. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 567 (majority opinion) (describing sexual intimacy as part of “a personal bond that is more
enduring”).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality) (reclassifying a woman’s interest in abortion as a liberty
interest, rather than a fundamental right).

1062

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:5

dered an eventual ruling finding a right to same sex-marriage inevitable.96
In United States v. Windsor,97 Justice Kennedy further relied on the animus analysis as the basis for striking down § 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act (“DOMA”). After citing the relevant line of cases, Justice Kennedy
stated, “The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon
all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”98 In dissent, Justice Scalia further maintained that
the majority opinion had not resolved what he viewed as the central issue in
the case: “The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even mention . . . whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than mere rationality.”99 Justice Scalia was correct. Although Justice Kennedy had shown
that rationality review is sometimes fatal, he had not yet resolved the question that most thought controlling in context of same-sex marriage, namely
which tier of scrutiny the Court would apply.
3. Intermediate in Theory but Either Strict or Rational in Fact
The final complication for tiers of scrutiny analysis involves intermediate scrutiny in gender- or sex-based classifications. This was the standard
that many envisioned in the context of same-sex marriage, and that, as previously explained, had been applied then rejected, in the context of affirmative action.100
The history of equal protection review of gender-based classifications is
well known.101 What started as a seemingly more piercing rational basis
scrutiny quickly emerged as a formal third tier. That tier requires proof of
an important governmental interest and means substantially in furtherance

96

97
98
99
100
101

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At the end of its opinion—after having laid
waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence—the Court says that the present case
‘does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.’ . . . Do not believe it.”). See also infra note 99 and accompanying text. Assuming Justice Scalia believed that Lawrence and United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013), controlled Obergefell, one might have envisioned a concurrence in the judgment, lamenting precedents to which he was bound as a matter of ironic consistency. That was not the
approach Justice Scalia ultimately chose. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2626 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682. For a further discussion of Windsor, see infra Part III.C.
Id. at 2693.
Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See supra Part I.C.1.
As is the history of substituting the grammatical term “gender” in place of the anatomical term
“sex.” See Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court, and Vice Versa,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14 (crediting Ginsburg’s secretary, who was concerned with improper connotations of “sex,” with the substitution).

June 2017]

THE INVERSION OF TIERS

1063

of that interest.102 The results have been mixed, as the Court has neither
systematically struck down nor sustained such classifications. The dividing
line appears to be that the Court sustains policies based on its perception of
real differences between the sexes or of laws seeking to overcome the present effects of historically adverse treatment of women, primarily in workplace settings. Conversely, the Court strikes down policies it believes reflect
“overbroad generalizations” about the sexes,103 sometimes called “old fogyism.”104 Two relatively recent cases demonstrate the analytical difficulties
these cases have presented.
In United States v. Virginia,105 Justice Ginsburg, writing for a majority,
struck down the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute
(“VMI”), a state military-style academy that prided itself on the adversative
method of training and its Spartan barracks life and dining arrangements,
especially for first years, referred to as “rats.” Under conventional intermediate scrutiny, the exclusion of women was arguably justified by the requisite accommodations respecting privacy and physical exertion imposed on
rats and even upperclassmen before women could enter the program. For
that reason, the Commonwealth developed the Virginia Women’s Institute
for Leadership (“VWIL”), housed at the all-women’s Mary Baldwin College, for women interested in developing military-style leadership skills in
what the creators regarded as a more congenial setting.106
As Justice Ginsburg observed, the differences between the two programs—VMI and VWIL—were profound, including philosophical differences in pedagogy, with VWIL focused on group participation and building
self-esteem rather than the breakdown-and-rebuild model embodied in the
adversative method, and qualitative differences in degree programs, faculty,
and opportunities for alumni networking.107 The Virginia case thus resembled Sweatt v. Painter,108 as the Court drew parallels between VWIL in the
context of gender and the obviously inadequate effort by Texas to construct
a law school for blacks in lieu of admission to the flagship University of Texas School of Law in the context of race.109 Still, there were notable differences between Virginia and Sweatt, not the least of which was the context—
gender, not race—and the doctrine—intermediate scrutiny, not strict.
If intermediate scrutiny accommodates legislation recognizing real-sex
differences and if admitting women requires changing institutional accul-

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
Id. at 543 (citation omitted).
Id. at 556–58.
Id. at 526–27.
Id.
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 553–54.
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turation and pedagogy, then a small number of women seeking admission
to VMI would not suffice to invalidate the exclusion of women. Given the
preexisting understanding of the test to accommodate laws reflecting such
differences between the sexes, Justice Ginsburg thus had to refine intermediate scrutiny to strike the law down. She did so by stating that the government has the burden to show an “exceedingly persuasive justification”
for its policy,110 which must be contemporaneous, and thus intended at the
time of enactment, rather than constructed to justify the policy after the
fact.111 This doctrinal transformation had three important components.
First, the burden of proof is squarely on the government. Second, an “exceedingly persuasive justification” is closer to “compelling” than “important.” Third, that justification must be contemporaneous.
The contemporaneity requirement proved essential in striking VMI’s
exclusion of women. Even if the adversative system and spartan barracks
life were grounded in important pedagogical concerns that justified excluding women, which the majority refuted,112 that was irrelevant if the Virginia
legislature did not rest on those reasons when creating VMI in 1839. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in his concurrence in the judgment, since
Virginia was unaware of any obligation to offer such a program to women
until, at the earliest, the 1982 decision, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,113 which held that an all-women’s nursing program violated the equal
protection rights of men, the majority analysis produced a constitutional
anachronism.114
This strict version of intermediate scrutiny did not last. In Tuan Anh
Nguyen v. INS,115 Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority, sustained an INS
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 524 (citations omitted).
Id. at 536 (citations omitted).
Id. at 549–50.
458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 561–62 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
533 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2001). As this Article was nearing publication, the Supreme Court issued
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., recused), which continued the
ongoing volley as to whether intermediate scrutiny, as applied to parental sex-based immigration
distinctions, is lite or heavy. The case involved a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause challenge to § 1401(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1958 ed.). Id.
at 1686 n.1. The provision imposed a longer—ten-year, five of which must be post-age fourteen—durational residency requirement on U.S. citizen fathers, as compared to a one-year durational residency requirement for U.S. citizen mothers, who are the parents with a non-U.S. citizen of an illegitimate child born outside the United States who later seeks to become a U.S.
citizen. The child of a deceased U.S. citizen father, who fell short of the post-age fourteen, fiveyear requirement by twenty days, and who was himself subject to deportation due to his criminal
record, brought suit. Id. at 1686. He claimed that because he would have been granted citizenship status, thereby preventing deportation, had his mother been a U.S. citizen, the statute violated his equal protection rights as applied to the federal government under the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause.
Justice Ginsburg wrote for a majority of six, including Justice Kennedy, who wrote the Nguyen majority opinion. (Justices Thomas wrote a concurrence in the judgment that Justice Alito

June 2017]

THE INVERSION OF TIERS

1065

policy that automatically conferred citizenship status on the foreign-born
illegitimate children of U.S. citizen mothers, but that required affirmative
steps prior to maturity before similarly situated children of U.S. citizen fathers could acquire citizenship.116 The Nguyen majority held that real sex
differences justified the policy because whereas fathers of illegitimate children are often unaware of the conception, let alone birth, of the child,
mothers of illegitimate children are invariably aware of their births and are
thus more likely to form meaningful parental bonds.117 Even though at the
time of enactment, one consideration was proof of paternity, a concern
overtaken by DNA testing, that contemporaneous justification proved irrelevant. Justice Kennedy’s opinion omitted any discussion of exceedingly
persuasive justifications that the government must prove. Instead, he reverted to the pre-Virginia intermediate scrutiny analysis, which generally deferred to claims of real-sex differences.
This analysis raises two important points: First, although the Court has
articulated an intermediate scrutiny standard, in this context the test does
no real work. Behind the intermediate scrutiny veil, the Court readily sorts
into the presumptively good bin (intermediate lite) those laws based on real
differences or that remedy past adverse treatment and into the presumptively bad bin (intermediate heavy) those laws based on “old fogyism.” Of
course the old-fashioned two-tiered scheme, with rational basis in place of
intermediate lite and strict scrutiny in place of intermediate heavy, is entirely adequate to this binary task. Both the Virginia case, which required redefining intermediate scrutiny to strike down a law implicating a real sex dif-

116

117

joined, and Justice Gorsuch did not participate). In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg ratcheted back
up the demands of intermediate scrutiny consistent with her earlier opinion, United States v. Virginia, albeit by distinguishing, not overruling, INS v. Nguyen. She reasoned that whereas Nguyen involved the validity of a sex-based parental acknowledgement requirement, thus arguably promoting connectedness to the United States, Morales-Santana instead involved a challenge to the more
attenuated sex-based parental durational residency requirement. Although Ginsburg determined
that the statutory distinction drawn in § 1401(a)(7) violated due process, she nonetheless denied
relief on the ground that the Supreme Court was not empowered to level-up a remedy respecting
naturalization. Id. at 1698. Because the Court ultimately denied Mr. Morales-Santana relief, the
Court’s due process analysis, including its elevation of the intermediate scrutiny test, might be
construed as dictum. See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57
STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005). Whether this part of the opinion is holding or dictum, however, has
no bearing on the dimensionality analysis. In either case, the question remains where to draw the
permissibility line along a single dimension of gender and anti-subordination. See also United
States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Nguyen, “intermediate scrutiny applies to Flores-Villar’s gender-based
claim and rational basis review applies to his age-based claim, [such that] the residence requirements of [the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.] §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409 survive.”), aff’d
by an equally divided court, 564 U.S. 210, 210 (2011) (per curiam) (Kagan, J., recused).
For a discussion of a fractured-panel predecessor case raising closely related issues, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), including a breakdown of the opinions, see STEARNS, supra note 44, at
7–14.
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70, 73.
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ference,118 and the more recent case, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, which, although not overruling Nguyen, had a similar effect, suggest that the intermediate scrutiny volley continues.119
Second, the analysis helps to explain why Justice Kennedy avoided
treating restrictions on same-sex marriage as a gender-based classification
in Obergefell. Justice Kennedy had already resolved intermediate scrutiny
away from Justice Ginsburg’s stricter Virginia version. Although Justice
Kennedy could easily have distinguished Nguyen in Obergefell given their very
different contexts, he might have reasoned that treating a same-sex marriage bans as an illicit gender-based classification would nonetheless force a
retreat from his skeptical stance on strict intermediate scrutiny.
D. Critiques and Proposals
This case survey suffices to explain the critical reception that the Supreme Court’s approach to tiers of scrutiny has received. Although aspects
of the scheme are not without defenders,120 commentators have generally
criticized the Court’s approach, focusing on apparent doctrinal inconsistencies, disingenuous applications of standards, and outcomes that seem overly
determined by the chosen tier.121 These concerns have given rise to myriad, sometimes conflicting, doctrinal prescriptions. Most notably, proposals
for reform have included Justice Stevens’s advocating abandoning tiers of
scrutiny altogether in favor of a uniform approach to all equal protection
cases,122 and Justice Marshall’s advocating for a broad array of tiers, linked

118
119
120

121

122

See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text
For a discussion of Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017), and United States v.
Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), see supra note 115.
See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 298, 329 (1998) (“Intermediate scrutiny . . . is generally a better solution to analogical crisis [of the sort characterized by comparing race, sex, and sexual preference] than denying certiorari, implementing a sliding-scale approach, or announcing a maximalist rule.”).
See Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2343–46 (2006) (summarizing “[s]tandard
[c]ritiques of [t]iered [r]eview,” including lack of guidance, excessive rigidity, and inadequate
normative foundation).
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is only one
Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct the
courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.”); see
also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 484 (2004) (“[T]he
problems with the three-tiered framework for judicial scrutiny are sufficient to warrant immediate consideration of an alternative standard for review, such as the single standard proposed
here . . . .”); Lawrence G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 819, 824 (2002) (“The hard-judicial-look approach [set out in United States v. Virginia] could and should become the norm in both racial and gender cases.”); Jeffrey M. Shaman,
Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 177 (1984)
(“The multiple tiers could be transformed readily into a comprehensive system based upon the
unitary standard . . . which in all instances would inquire whether there is an appropriate gov-

June 2017]

THE INVERSION OF TIERS

1067

to the invidiousness of the classification or the importance of the claimed
right.123 More recently, in avoiding discussing tiers altogether, Justice Kennedy has at least implicitly offered yet another approach.124
Although the system of tiers is problematic, the discussion that follows
explains why none of these prescriptive approaches can succeed in repairing it. A system resembling tiers of scrutiny is an inevitable feature of equal
protection doctrine. Applying the existing tiers would be simpler and more
compelling if the Court better related its scheme of tiers to the dimensionality of the underlying case law.
II. TIERS AND DIMENSIONALITY
The following discussion offers an innovative framework for analyzing
tiers of scrutiny. We begin with a simple numerical illustration. Although
the example does not capture the nuance and complexity of constitutional
doctrine, abstracting away from such detail, and then adding layers of
complexity, will help relate the essential concepts to underlying cases.
A. Odds, Evens, Primes, and Non-Primes
Consider a simple binary division of whole numbers as odd or even,
presented horizontally in Table 3.125 These broad categories, resting along
a single dimension, suffice to sort as small a set as two consecutive integers
(2, 3), or infinite integers (2, 3, 4, etc.), based on whether that number can
be divided by two while yielding another whole number. None of the
numbers listed as odds (3, 5, 7, etc.) meet this criterion; all numbers listed
under evens (2, 4, 6, 8, etc.) do. These two categories, resting along the
odds/evens dimension, suffice for this elementary sorting task even over potentially infinite whole numbers.

123

124
125

ernmental interest suitably furthered by the governmental action in question.”) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of
standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This
spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance
of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the
particular classification is drawn.”); see also James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection
Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301,
2311 (2006) (concluding from review of cases that Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall were correct that “[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause, with a ‘continuum of judgmental responses’ or a ‘spectrum of standards.’”).
See infra Part II.C. (relating Kennedy’s avoidance of tiers to Justice Stevens’s and Justice Marshall’s proposals).
Whole numbers are the subset of integers that are non-negative.
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TABLE 3
DIMENSIONALITY IN CATEGORIZING INTEGERS
Odds

Evens

Primes

3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 17, 19 . . .

2

Non-Primes

9, 15, 21, . . .

4, 6, 8, . . .

Now consider adding another criterion: is each listed integer a prime
number, meaning a whole number larger than 1 that can only be divided by
itself and 1 while generating a whole number? Sorting whole numbers as
odd or even cannot complete this sorting task. The difficulty is that the
number 2 is an even prime, whereas the remaining primes are a subset of
odds. The number 2 is thus the mathematical equivalent of an aloft hot air
balloon.126 Without introducing the separate primes/non-primes categories,
even the simple sequence of integers—234—presented in bold in Table 3
cannot be sorted according to the criteria of odd/even, prime/non-prime.
This holds even though either binary scheme—odds/evens or primes/nonprimes—suffices to sort infinite data,127 and even though a single dimension
can capture multiple criteria that move in a common direction.128
Constitutional doctrine is obviously more complex than sorting integers.
And yet, assessing challenged laws based on tiers of scrutiny implicates a
similar dimensionality problem. As with integers, infinite cases or challenged laws can be sorted over two tiers—rational basis or strict scrutiny—
that rest along a single dimension, provided that the dimension accurately
captures the relevant normative stakes. And yet, certain constitutional hot
air balloons—affirmative action and cases implicating politically unpopular
groups that are neither suspect nor quasi-suspect—can thwart a sorting
scheme that fails to appreciate the need for an additional dimension. The
remainder of this Part explores these points in the context of evolving rules.

126

127

128

The dimensionality analysis also helps to explain why the original sequence of tiers, 12345, is less
predictive than the peculiar sequence, 14325. See supra Tables 1 and 2; see also supra note 15 (clarifying assumptions).
Thus, for each listed dimension, we can overlay an additional normative criterion—small to
large—without forcing yet another dimension. In Table 3, starting in the upper left and moving
clockwise or counterclockwise, for each box we can plot an infinite sequence from small to large.
See Table 3.
By combining categories vertically or horizontally along each separate dimension, Table 3 reveals
small-to-large odds or evens (the horizontal dimension), and small-to-large primes or non-primes
(the vertical dimension).
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B. Shifting Lines Along a Single Dimension
A single dimension can accommodate not only infinite data, but also
changes in how we sort data over time. Imagine the need to divide children
and adults. In the ancient Jewish tradition, the age of thirteen marked the
Bar Mitzvah (for boys only, with girls considered adults at twelve).129 Even
the most devout Jew would no longer consider a boy of thirteen (or a girl of
twelve) an adult.130 For a long time within the United States and elsewhere,
many marked adulthood at the age of eighteen, corresponding roughly to
completing high school. For many, meaningful responsibility is deferred
through the end of college, typically age twenty-two. And the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”) treats offspring up to age twenty-six as “children” for insurance purposes,131 potentially extending dependency through the comple129
130

131

See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUDAISM 106, 109–10 (Geoffrey Wigoder et al. eds., 2d ed.
2002) (dating earliest liturgical bat mitzvah ceremony to the 1920s).
That is, other than for the very limited purpose of counting toward a minyan, the requisite quorum of ten required for collective prayer. Id. at 106. This also marks the point of assuming personal responsibility for mitsvot, or religious good deeds. Id.
Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001(a)(5), 124 Stat. 119, 132 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14) (amending § 2714(a) of the Public Health Service Act) (requiring insurers offering coverage for the dependent children of beneficiaries to cover “an adult child (who is not
married) until the child turns 26”). During his campaign and in the early months of his presidency,
President Donald Trump pledged to “repeal and replace” the ACA, also known as “Obamacare.”
Early on, his administration took steps toward repeal, but without putting forth a comprehensive replacement proposal. See Mark Landler, Trump Says Health Law Replacement May Not Be Ready Until Next
Year, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/donald-trumphealth-care-law-repeal-replace-plan.html (noting that President Trump stated in an interview that a replacement health care law would likely not be ready until the end of 2017 or 2018 but that he had
“signed an executive order to begin unwinding the [ACA]” in January 2017); Julie Hirschfeld Davis &
Robert Pear, Trump Issues Executive Order Scaling Back Parts of Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/us/politics/trump-executive-order-obamacare.html (describing President Trump’s first executive order, which “directed government agencies to scale back as many
aspects of the [ACA] as possible,” but noting that the President had yet to devise a replacement plan).
After the House finally approved a plan to repeal Obamacare, albeit without a comprehensive alternative plan that would, for example, ensure coverage for those with pre-existing conditions, Republican Senate leaders proved unable to satisfactorily amend the bill. They instead
moved to send a slightly modified version of the House bill to the Senate floor, opening it more
broadly to motions to amend. The leadership simultaneously sought assurances from their
House counterparts that the bill, which became known as the “skinny repeal,” would not be
passed and sent to the President in its then-existing form should the Senate pass it. Juliet Eilperin
et al., Senate Rejects Measure to Partly Repeal Affordable Care Act, Dealing GOP Leaders a Major Setback,
WASH. POST (July 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senate-gop-leaderswork-to-round-up-votes-for-modest-health-care-overhaul/2017/07/27/ac08fc40-72b7-11e78839-ec48ec4cae25_story.html (noting that Senators McCain, Graham, and Johnson had sought
“an iron-clad guarantee . . . that . . . the House would not move to quickly approve the bill in its
current form . . . .”).
These developments coincided with an announcement that Senator John McCain (R.
Ariz.), whose vote was likely to be decisive, had suffered a rare brain cancer requiring surgery.
Noam N. Levey & Lisa Mascaro, With Pence Breaking a Tie, Senate Votes to Begin Debate on Obamacare Repeal Bill, L.A. TIMES (July 25, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-
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tion of graduate or professional training. In effect, we have seen a doubling
through four- or five-year increments—thirteen, eighteen, twenty-two, and
twenty-six—of a once-accepted age of maturity.132
TABLE 4
SHIFTING DIVISION ALONG A SINGLE DIMENSION
Age of Maturity
Adult

Child
Child

Adult
Child

13

Adult
Child
18

Adult
22

26

The single dimension—young to old—accommodates the incremental
adjustment of adulthood from ancient to modern times.133 To be sure, such
blunt divisions might not succeed for all affected persons. Given the purpose for which the line is drawn—the ability to participate in particular religious rituals, to enter into binding contracts, to consent to sexual activity,
to marry, to finish school, to work, to live on one’s own, to assume personal
financial responsibility—its placement determines who can and who cannot
lawfully engage in, or be held accountable for, the consequences of such activities. The rule accomplishes this sorting function even though some indi-

132

133

obamacare-senate-vote-20170725-story.html. In a dramatic sequence of events, after surgery,
McCain flew from Arizona to Washington to vote in favor the procedural maneuver to get the
bill to the floor with the result of a tie, which Vice President Pence broke in favor of approval.
Id. The debates included an emotional floor speech by McCain that received great fanfare, after which he cast the decisive vote that defeated the bill. In fact, the bill would also have failed
had McCain not returned for the procedural vote. For my contemporaneous account of “The
McCain Moment,” and of why Senators Susan Collins (R. Me.) and Lisa Murkowski (R. Alaska), who were more persistent in opposing skinny repeal received less limelight, see Max
Stearns,
The
McCain
Moment,
BLINDSPOT
(July
28,
2017),
https://www.blindspotblog.us/single-post/2017/07/28/The-McCain-Moment, and Max
Stearns, About Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski, BLINDSPOT (July 28, 2017),
https://www.blindspotblog.us/single-post/2017/07/28/About-Susan-Collins-and-LisaMurkowski.
For a recent debate relying on neuroscience to assess the child-adult line, see Laurence Steinberg,
Adulthood: What the Brain Says About Maturity, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012, 3:09 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/28/do-we-need-to-redefineadulthood/adulthood-what-the-brain-says-about-maturity (arguing that different age thresholds
of legal maturity for different types of acts is the natural implication of the varying rates of maturation of different parts of the brain).
In other contexts, the relationship of age to other criteria, like competency to grant consent,
could require a splitting of dimensions, as when considering the diminished capacity of those who
are the very young or aged. Id.
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viduals sorted as children are more mature than others sorted as adults and
vice versa.134 That is the nature of a rule.
Dimensionality is highly relevant to evolving bodies of constitutional
doctrine. Degrees of invidiousness of challenged classifications or of the
importance of claimed fundamental rights are equally subject to shifting societal understandings—and thus shifting lines along the relevant dimension—over time. Same-sex marriage is the most obvious modern illustration. The speed with which societal impressions on this issue have changed,
thereby affecting dramatic legal change, has been stunning.135 A mere generation ago, one prominent liberal scholar described constitutional arguments supporting same-sex marriage as “quite adventurous.”136 Indeed,
they were, highlighting the Red Queen nature of constitutional law making.
The case law trajectory including Romer v. Evans,137 Lawrence v. Texas,138 and
United States v. Windsor,139 created an increasingly firm foundation for such
challenges, leaving most observers wondering how, not if, the Supreme
Court would find in favor of the Obergefell claimants.
C. On the Inevitability of Tiers
Even sorting constitutional cases along a single dimension can generate
complexity. To illustrate, imagine how Justice Stevens’s proposed regime—a
single meaningful tier for all cases arising under the Equal Protection
Clause—would operate in practice. Justice Stevens long maintained that
equal protection demands that laws operate consistently with a regime that

134

135

136

137
138

139

For example, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012), the Supreme Court extended
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), which disallowed the death penalty for juveniles, to
further disallow mandatory life without parole for juveniles, acknowledging that some below age
eighteen have sufficient cognitive awareness to comprehend the gravity of their offenses, whereas
others above eighteen may not.
President Obama’s “evolution” presents a good example. See Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker,
Obama Says Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-says-same-sex-marriage-should-belegal.html (describing President Obama’s endorsement of same-sex marriage and characterizing
it as a “transformation on the issue”).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1994) (“[T]he argument I
have explored here—for the proposition that same-sex relations and even same-sex marriages
may not be banned consistently with the Equal Protection Clause—is, to say the least, quite adventurous.”).
517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that a Colorado law that singled out homosexuals as a class
for unequal treatment was forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause).
539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003) (holding that a Texas law criminalizing same-sex private consensual intimate conduct violated protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause and was
thus unconstitutional).
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutionally discriminated against same-sex couples married under their states’ laws).
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governs impartially.140 Although impartiality is an appealing conception, applying it in actual cases can test constitutional doctrine in unanticipated ways.
From the perspective of lower federal and state courts, a single tier identifies an analytical dimension along which a line demarcating permissibility
and impermissibility will eventually be drawn. The Supreme Court does
not typically seek out a precise dividing line within any given case.141 Rather, over myriad cases, the Court identifies particular features that result in
each challenged law being sustained or struck down. Lower courts carefully read these cases for guidance. Eventually those courts will come to associate certain descriptors as signaling a presumptively problematic law, and
others as signaling a presumptively non-problematic law. Because of the
inevitably dynamic responses, most notably by legislatures or other lawmakers, to the Court’s pronouncements, a set of proxies emerges that inform the initial sorting. Over time, as lawmakers seek to avoid adverse
characterizations based on the Court’s pronouncements that prevent them
from accomplishing certain objectives, the Court identifies other rules that
allow a search for errors missed in the initial sort.
Eventually as characterizations solidify, some come to be associated with
presumptively bad, and others with presumptively good, laws. Those respective groupings fall on opposite sides of what inevitably becomes a de facto dividing line. Along the relevant analytical dimension, the dividing line sorts
characterizations associated with invidious versus non-invidious classifications, and sorts characterizations associated with fundamental rights versus
mere liberty interests. Once again, the analysis is not changed by the fact
that the precise location of that line is unknown or might change over time.
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s contrary approach, applying multiple tiers
of scrutiny based on the degree of invidiousness of the challenged classification or the relative importance of the claimed right, is subject to the same
analytical difficulty.142 Each approach—one standard or many—suffers
from a category mistake. The appropriate number of tiers must correlate
with the dimensionality of the case law, not with the number of cases or case
categories being sorted.143 Within any case law category, as precedents ac140

141
142
143

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is only one Equal
Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially.”). Cass Sunstein has suggested
more generally that the Constitution embraces a principle of impartiality. CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 24 (1993).
Indeed, such efforts might constitute dictum. See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(discussing a “spectrum of standards” in equal protection cases).
This follows from the insight that a single dimension can sort infinite data such as “odds or
evens,” or “primes or non-primes,” provided the relevant sorting criterion correlates to what the
dimension captures, and yet a single dimension cannot capture even three data—such as the sequence 2, 3, 4—if the relevant criteria, such as combining odds/evens and primes/non-primes,
thwart either single dimension. See supra Part II.A.
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cumulate, lower courts will realize which of the several tiers result in classifying the challenged law as presumptively bad or presumptively good, and
which factors justify further inquiry, leading to a potential opposite result
from that predicted by the initial sort.144 Whether starting with one or many
tiers, the Court will eventually achieve two presumptive tiers, albeit with different terminology, and until the signals sort themselves out, less guidance.
Justice Kennedy’s most recent decisions affecting sexual minorities are
subject to the same analysis. Although he avoided ascribing a specific tier
in Lawrence v. Texas,145 and avoided the language of tiers altogether in Obergefell v. Hodges,146 the holdings reveal that the challenged laws fall on the prohibited side of the relevant dimension along which such cases are inevitably
assessed.147 Future cases will reveal which, if any, laws affecting sexual minorities will fall instead on the permitted side of the same analytical dimension.148 Avoiding a discussion of tiers cannot eliminate the inevitability of
dimensionality in assessing the case law, a feature that necessarily results in
a set of tiers-like doctrines.149
D. Third Tier as Splitting the Difference
The preceding analysis further demonstrates the analytical difficulty of
the third tier. If intermediate scrutiny provides a means of avoiding difficult sorting decisions, the effect is temporary. The same set of difficulties
that confront the Marshall-Stevens-Kennedy approach to tiers inevitably
confronts the middle tier.150 We know that cases involving gender classifications are not automatically placed in the bin for presumptively bad or
presumptively good laws. What we do not know is which challenged gender-based laws are presumptively bad or presumptively good. Avoiding an
immediate answer does not mean avoiding an eventual answer.
Over time, the Court will attach characterizations to those cases that
are, in fact, presumptively bad (associated with “overbroad generalizations”
or “old fogyism”) or presumptively good (associated with “real-sex differences” and making up for past adverse treatment of women). Ironically,
given the context, once the intermediate scrutiny fig leaf is lifted, the true
144
145
146
147
148

149
150

This follows from Bayes theorem. See generally Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Uncertain Evidence with Sir
Thomas Bayes: A Note for Teachers, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 155 (1987).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
See infra Part III.C. (explaining that the prohibited side of the relevant analytical dimension is anti-subordination).
For example, we might imagine an unsuccessful equal protection challenge to a law providing
sexual minorities, as past victims of discrimination, special consideration in hiring in particular
employment contexts.
For a more detailed analysis, see infra Part III.C.
This is also true more generally of proposals for single-tier systems. See supra Part I.D. (describing
proposed alternative systems of tiers of scrutiny, including a single meaningful tier).

1074

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:5

gender dimorphism is revealed. Intermediate scrutiny lite becomes de facto
rational basis review, and intermediate scrutiny heavy becomes de facto
strict scrutiny. The so-called middle standard is doing no work in the context of gender classifications because if its purpose is to serve as a placeholder for tough eventual decisions, there is no work for it to do.151
Of course this does not mean that the two-tier system or the lines drawn
along the dimensions that such systems implicate invariably succeed. But it
does mean that a third tier must be justified by something other than present uncertainty. That “something” involves dimensionality, and this analysis returns us to race.
E. Expanded Dimensionality and the Benign Use of Race
Justice Brennan long advocated applying intermediate scrutiny in cases
challenging the so-called benign use of race, meaning cases in which the
challenged racial classification was intended to provide a benefit to identified racial minorities. For a short time, from Metro Broadcasting through
Adarand, he succeeded for federal racial preferences.152 Eventually, the
Court reverted to the traditional two-tier scheme—strict or rational basis
review—in race cases. Because the scheme conflates dimensions, the seeming simplification has had the opposite effect. Table 5 illustrates the conceptual difficulty.
TABLE 5
RACE AND DIMENSIONALITY
Condoning benign
use of race
Condoning adverse use of race
Not condoning adverse use of race

Modern Liberal

Not condoning benign use of race
Jim Crow
Color-blind

The vertical dimension involves the binary choice whether or not to
condone the adverse use of race, meaning reliance on race in a manner that
benefits whites as a class and harms blacks as a class. The horizontal dimension involves the separate binary choice whether or not to condone the
benign use of race, meaning laws designed to benefit blacks as a class at the
expense of whites or other non-recognized minorities as a class. Within
Table 5, “adverse” and “benign” are defined from the perspective of histor151

152

In contexts in which the goal is not to place data on either side of a binary permissibility line,
there is often a demand for intermediate categories. Thus, for example, commodities such as
medicines, prescription lenses, and clothing are measured in precise increments.
For a review of the case history, see infra Part I.C.1.
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ical victims of race-conscious discriminatory laws.
The scheme has been simplified with two binary choices even though
laws affecting race have historically reflected a spectrum and even though
the line of permissibility has shifted over time. Our country has moved
from permitting ownership of chattel slaves to permitting virtually any segregation to permitting segregation other than in public schools to permitting no formal segregation to grappling with the reality that race-neutral
laws often affect race-specific outcomes.153 And of course one could add
several gradations in between.
For purposes of the vertical dimension—condoning or not condoning
adverse use of race—the critical issue is not where the line is drawn at any
one time, but rather, it is the inevitability of drawing a line. In the modern
era, the line has been drawn so as to exclude all racial classifications that
harm African Americans in terms along with facially neutral laws that harm
African Americans in purpose and effect. The earlier historical position
from which the present line has moved was, of course, Jim Crow. That regime condoned express racial classifications operating to the benefit of
whites and to the detriment of blacks based on accepted societal, or dominant white, understandings concerning the appropriate relationships between the races.
Long before tiers of scrutiny were formalized,154 the color-blind understanding of equal protection implicitly assumed that laws affecting race
rested along a single dimension. Against the backdrop of laws countenanced by Jim Crow, the color-blind view of equal protection represented a
liberal position inasmuch as it would ban adverse race-conscious laws. This
was the view expressed, perhaps most poignantly, in Justice Harlan’s famous dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson:
[In] view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.155

The concept of a color-blind Constitution is admirable, especially in the
historical context of the Plessy decision. It remains so for those who embrace it as an ideal embedded within the Constitution. Justice Thomas
strongly asserted just this view in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1,156 and in his opposition to reliance on race as part of an
effort to help blacks, he identifies himself as heir to a tradition that includes

153

154
155
156

The 2016 Netflix documentary 13th draws an analogous trajectory from the subjugation of African Americans through slavery to Jim Crow to mass incarceration primarily of African-American
men. 13th (Kandoo Films & Netflix 2016).
For a discussion of the history of tiers, see Part I.A.
163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Justice Harlan. Thus, Justice Thomas states:
Most of the dissent’s criticisms of today’s result can be traced to its rejection of
the colorblind Constitution. The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of
a colorblind Constitution by consigning it to me and Members of today’s plurality. But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the
Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view in Plessy: “Our Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” And my view was the
rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown.157

Justice Thomas had previously gone further, claiming “a ‘moral [and]
constitutional equivalence,’ between laws designed to subjugate a race and
those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some
current notion of equality.”158 Justice Thomas has since softened his moralequivalence stance, acknowledging the good intentions of Justice Breyer,
who took an opposing position on the permissibility of elective raceconscious integration measures in public schools.159 Justice Thomas’s ultimate position on this question is less important than the merits of the substantive analysis contained in the longer Parents Involved quotation. The
analysis returns us to the problem of dimensionality.160
Justice Harlan expressed his view in a specific historical context. The
context reflected the then-dominant understanding that the relevant spectrum along which racial laws were assessed involved possible limitations on
a state’s power to use race in a manner perpetuating the status and interests
of the dominant white race. In the Plessy era, the prevalent understanding
condoned express reliance on race to perpetuate a racial caste, consistent
with then-dominant cultural mores. So long as the enacting legislature had
a rational justification in support of the law—otherwise, it would presuma-

157
158
159

160

Id. at 772 (citations omitted).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 781 n.30 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Justice Breyer’s good intentions,
which I do not doubt, have the shelf life of Justice Breyer’s tenure.”). Justice Thomas later posited: “There is no principled distinction between the University’s assertion that diversity yields educational benefits and the segregationists’ assertion that segregation yielded those same benefits.”
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2428 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). Assuming that what makes those who condone race-conscious affirmative action morally equivalent to
those condoning Jim Crow is (1) the willing acceptance of race-conscious policies that have (2) the
purpose and effect of harming African Americans, the parenthetical quotation is in tension with
Justice Thomas’s earlier moral-equivalence stance. In acknowledging Justice Breyer’s good faith
in Parents Involved, Justice Thomas implies that Justice Breyer, along with the other dissenters, does
not seek to harm, but rather seeks to help, blacks, even if he disagrees on the merits of the underlying policies in question.
There is, in addition, a contestable factual premises embedded in Justice Thomas’s analysis.
Whereas Justice Thomas claims that the Brown litigants embraced Justice Harlan’s color-blind vision, historians have demonstrated that color blindness was part of a larger strategy that freely
combined elements of anti-classification and of anti-subordination, and that the deciding justices
did not uniformly embrace either theory. See generally Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the
Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (2008).
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bly violate dominant social mores—the law would be sustained.
Even Justice Brown, writing for the Plessy majority, acknowledged possible laws that might cross the permissibility line, namely those with the sole
or dominant purpose of harassing the minority race.161 Justice Harlan, relying on his color-blind reading of equal protection, drew a more restrictive
line of permissibility. In his view, whatever the dominant cultural norms of
the day were, the races—more to the point, whites—had to realize that
their fates were inextricably intertwined. And thus, Justice Harlan asked,
what could more powerfully prevent eventual, and indeed inevitable, race
progress than a law boldly signaling that one race was so unfit as to be unsuited to sit next to another on a railway coach?162
Although the Supreme Court has nominally applied strict scrutiny while
sustaining a limited use of race in the context of admissions in state institutions of higher learning, it inevitably distorted its tiers analysis in doing so.
In addition to relaxing the understanding of narrow tailoring so as not to
require exhausting race-neutral alternatives that might accomplish diversity
at the expense of the law school’s elite status, the Grutter majority afforded
unprecedented deference to the law school’s asserted desire to eventually
bring to a close its reliance on race-advertent admissions.163 The Grutter
majority accepted the law school’s claimed holistic daily monitoring, which
functionally replicated the Gratz Court’s rejected point-driven algorithm.164
This might help to explain why in Fisher I, Justice Kennedy claimed that
as applied to the University of Texas, the Grutter version of strict scrutiny
appeared “feeble in fact.”165 Traditional strict scrutiny would not delegate
to the very institution seeking to defend its race-conscious policy against an
equal protection challenge the power to determine that its claimed interest
was sufficiently compelling or that its chosen means were adequately tailored. In remanding Fisher I, Justice Kennedy implied that Grutter’s strict
scrutiny framework was at war with itself.
More surprising, perhaps, was Justice Kennedy’s apparent about-face in
161

162

163

164
165

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549–50 (1896) (illustrating, with laws that would require blacks
and whites to walk on opposite sides of the street, that state use of the police power must “not [be
used] for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.”.)
Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even then, Justice Harlan was explicit that his concern was
limited to formal legal equality; he continued to adhere to the idea that the races were destined to
remain in a state of social inequality. Id. at 559.
See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the Grutter decision in more detail); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable raceneutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation
for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all
racial groups.”); id. at 343 (“We take the Law School at its word that it would ‘like nothing better
than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will terminate its race-conscious admissions
program as soon as practicable.”).
See supra Part I.C.1.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).
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Fisher II.166 Justice Elena Kagan had recused herself in both Fisher I and Fisher
II,167 and by the time Fisher II was decided, Justice Scalia had passed away,168
leaving seven justices to decide the case. Justice Kennedy emerged the pivotal justice on the seven-member Court, which would decide whether affirmative action would be jettisoned or retained.169 As the median justice, joining
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg in voting to uphold the Texas
plan, and with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito voting to
strike it down, Justice Kennedy revealed himself as unwilling to end racebased affirmative action in higher education. Justice Kennedy thus sustained
the Texas plan even though in doing so, he condoned the very deferential
strict scrutiny analysis of race that he had deemed feeble in Fisher I.
Table 5 exposes the analytical difficulty in using strict scrutiny to accomplish the Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher II results as a problem of dimensionality. Benign race-conscious programs, specifically affirmative action, occupy
the lower left box, whereas adverse race-conscious laws, namely Jim Crow,
occupy the upper right box, within a two-dimensional issue space. In a
world in which relevant laws rested along a single dimension, with laws
harming minorities at one end and race-neutral laws at the opposite end,
Harlan’s color-blind Constitution is not merely apt—it is comprehensive.170
166

167

168

169

170

See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2212 (2016) (“Though a college must continually reassess its need for race-conscious review, here that assessment appears to have been
done with care . . . .”). For a more detailed analysis, see infra Part II.F.2.
See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: What’s at Issue in the Fisher Case This Time?, SCOTUSBLOG
(Dec. 2, 2015, 12:39 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/argument-preview-whats-atissue-in-the-fisher-case-this-time/ (reporting that Justice Kagan had to recuse herself from both
Fisher decisions due to “her role in the government’s part in the case” while serving as U.S. Solicitor General).
See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0 (reporting on Justice
Scalia’s death).
A majority of four on a seven-member Supreme Court is treated as binding precedent. See 28
U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the
United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”); Mitchell
v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 615 (1974) (affording binding status to Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972), a 4-3 decision in which Justices Powell and Rehnquist abstained); see also Jonathan
Remy Nash, The Majority That Wasn’t: Stare Decisis, Majority Rule, and the Mischief of Quorum Requirements, 58 EMORY L.J. 831, 834–35 (2009) (discussing historical instances of a four-Justice majority
in the Supreme Court).
Locating benign racial preferences before the modern era is fraught. Some post-Civil War laws
benefitted blacks based on specific statuses, notably as former slaves or dependent widows, as opposed to based on race (thus also benefitting some whites). See Ira C. Colby, The Freedmen’s Bureau:
From Social Welfare to Segregation, 46 PHYLON 219, 219 (1985) (noting that historians debate the
reputability of the Freeman’s Bureau’s attempts to better the positions of freedmen because of its
support of segregationist policies). Justice Thomas rested on this very distinction in Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 n.19 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“What the dissent fails to understand . . . is that the colorblind Constitution does not bar
the government from taking measures to remedy past state-sponsored discrimination—indeed, it
requires that such measures be taken in certain circumstances. Race-based government
measures during the 1860’s and 1870’s to remedy state-enforced slavery were therefore not incon-
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In that world, wherever the eventual line is drawn along the single dimension—harmful race-conscious laws to race-neutral laws—color blindness
represents the minority-protecting position; conversely, along that same
dimension, a regime that condones race advertence is decidedly illiberal.
And yet, introducing benign race-advertent laws, the constitutional equivalent of an aloft hot air balloon, forces a dimensionality split.
The terms “adverse” or “benign” require clarification. Justice Thomas
claims all use of race is inherently problematic such that he rejects labeling
any such use as benign.171 This posit, however, does not eliminate the separate analytical dimensions respecting race depicted in Table 5. To see
why, we must consider why race is widely condemned as a permissible basis
for legal categorization.
All laws draw lines along some analytical dimension, thereby defining
which activity is or is not permitted to particular classes of individuals. The
analytical dimension along which the classifications are drawn, in either a
binary or spectral fashion, can involve quite literally anything: sex, height,
weight, wealth, IQ, willingness to pay, ability to perform a given task, or
completion of degrees or other formal training. As an historical matter,
classifications have also included race. Why has race almost exclusively
been taken off the table?
It will not do to suggest that of all the potential bases for classification in
the world (those listed above plus countless others), only skin color or other
racial characteristics are sacrosanct. It also cannot be because race is never
plausibly relevant, which is all that would be required if race were subject to
rational basis scrutiny. Rather, throughout most of history—not merely in
the United States—empowered groups have used race to acquire and

171

sistent with the colorblind Constitution.”) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). Other
post-Civil War laws targeted destitute blacks as a class. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107
YALE L.J. 427, 430–33 (1997) (citing and describing statutes which were designed to provide financial support only to “destitute ‘colored’ persons”); Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau
Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1397 (2016). These laws operated in parallel with laws
benefiting destitute whites, see id. at 431 n.23, and thus employed race for administrability purposes, not as an early counterpart to modern benign race-based preferences.
Even so, Table 5 does not necessarily preclude the benign use of race during the Jim Crow
era, which is why it frames the dimensions in terms of which practices are or are not condoned.
Consider the combined effect of laws that are or are not condoned along each separate dimension. During Jim Crow, the dominant (illiberal) understanding condoned a regime in which the
only race-specific laws were adverse to blacks (thus lacking benign race-based laws); the color
blindness position failed to condone any race-based laws on the understanding that all such laws
were detrimental to blacks; and the modern liberal position condones benign race-based laws but
not adverse race-based laws. In this reading, each camp believes that its combined views are
consistent with equal protection even if each separate component is not specifically compelled.
And each camp holds a contrary view respecting the permissibility of at least one, and possibly
both, of the alternative combinations.
See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.

1080

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:5

maintain privilege, often through brute force, at the expense of other
groups. The historical problem is reliance on race to entrench dominant
power structures at the expense of disadvantaged minorities and sometimes
out-of-power majorities.172
Simply put, the historical use of race has almost always been adverse,
often severely, to out-of-power groups, and in the United States, that has
most notably included African Americans. Race is not off-limits because it
has randomly been plucked for exclusion. Rather, race has been excluded
because historically race has been employed adversely to minorities. For
some, this alone is sufficient to ban its use altogether. That position, however, does not contradict characterizing some intended uses of race as adverse, and others as benign. And most importantly, these characterizations
do not depend on the wisdom or efficacy of the policies under review.173
The fact that the category “race” is excluded due to its adverse historical treatment of blacks means that it has been used to benefit those in power. This necessarily implies that racial classifications can be structured in
reverse, seeking to help those who have been historically subordinated due
to race, with a cost borne by those who have been historically dominant.
Table 5 labels this the benign use of race.174
Table 5 reveals a true dimensionality problem. Although the Jim Crow
and modern liberal positions embrace opposing positions on each of the
two critical questions—(1) condoning or not condoning adverse use of race,
and (2) condoning or not condoning benign use of race—unlike the colorblind camp, each condones some use of race. Color blindness might appear to offer a partial victory to each side. Those embracing color blindness join modern liberals, who would not condone the adverse use of race.
They also join Jim Crow, which did not condone benign use of race. Despite this, because these combined positions implicate more than a single
dimension, color blindness does not occupy a middle ground between the
modern liberal and Jim Crow positions.

172

173

174

Consider, for example, apartheid-era South Africa. Christopher A. Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas
of Racial and Ethnic Identity in American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1953, 1956–57 (1996) (noting that “approximately eighty-seven percent of the population was
disadvantaged by formal race classification during the decades of apartheid: the country’s 29.26
million Africans, 3.08 million mixed-race ‘Coloureds,’ and 1.16 million persons of Indian descent.”) (footnotes omitted).
Just as it would be mistaken to label an adverse racial policy benign because it fortuitously produces a beneficial result for some minorities, so too it would be mistaken to label a benign result
adverse because it sometimes produces the opposite effect.
The term “benign” might also appear objectionable on the ground that policies benefiting minorities based on race impose costs on non-minorities based on race. For consistency, reframing
from the perspective of the non-minority race requires flipping the words “benign” and “adverse”
along both dimensions. This produces the same dimensionality problem, albeit with reversed labels.
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F. Dimensionality, Cycling, and Multicriterial Decision Making
The presentation that follows lays the analytical foundation for a critical
insight: as applied to race, the problem of dimensionality can persist even
though only two of the three positions that generate it are presently occupied. More generally, dimensionality and the related phenomenon of cycling can arise even if one of the contributing historical positions has been
abandoned. That is because present positions are influenced by abandoned
past positions, which combine to effect multicriterial decision making. Although modern liberals and those embracing a color-blind view abhor Jim
Crow, these current positions remain influenced by that discredited position
because each draws different lessons—and generates different rules—in response to past mistakes associated with Jim Crow. The remaining discussion in this subpart, which is somewhat technical, provides the analytical
tools that explain this insight, thus strengthening the analysis of how dimensionality has affected affirmative action, same-sex marriage, and other
equal protection doctrines.175
1. Cycling and the Condorcet Paradox
The analysis begins with three individuals (P1, P2, and P3) holding the
following ordinal preferences over options ABC: P1: ABC, P2: BCA, P3:
CAB. Assume that each person holds internally transitive orderings, meaning that P1 not only prefers A to B to C, but also A to C; P2 not only prefers B to C to A, but also C to A; and so on. Because this group has no first
choice majority candidate, a plausible way of working this through would
be to take binary comparisons (A versus B, B versus C, etc.) hoping that a
consensus candidate emerges. With the listed preferences, however, the
group will instead discover that P1 and P2 prefer B to C, P2 and P3 prefer
C to A, and yet with one more iteration, P1 and P3 prefer A to B. The result is a cycle in which the group prefers A to B and B to C, but C to A.
The cycle is not inevitable. If we slightly modify P3’s preferences so that
she ranks her preferences CBA rather than CAB, although there is still no
first-choice winner, a stable outcome emerges. A regime of binary comparisons reveals that P1 and P2 prefer B to C, and P2 and P3 prefer B to A.
This time, a final comparison, between A and C, is beside the point. Although P2 and P3 prefer C to A, B defeats either alternative in direct comparisons. In social choice theory, option B, the option that defeats all others in direct comparisons, is known as a Condorcet winner.176

175
176

Those wishing to avoid the technical presentation can rest on the preceding summary, and continue with Part II.F.2.
For a general discussion, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103
YALE. L.J. 1219 (1994).
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Although Condorcet winners and rules capable of generating them
when they are available are often viewed favorably, such rules carry important limitations. When there is no Condorcet winner and when the institution must generate an outcome, rules ensuring that Condorcet winners
prevail risk cycling instead of producing an outcome. Cycling need not imply endless indeterminacy. It might mean no more than that the chosen
outcome was arbitrary in the sense that it was heavily influenced by the order of decisions, such that a different voting protocol might have yielded a
different outcome.177 In addition, the Condorcet criterion only allows the
expression of ordinal rankings; it does not permit participants to register
how intensely they feel about particular options.
Dimensionality is the condition that generates cycling preferences. Dimensionality implies a cycle in that it creates the conditions from which,
with plausible assumptions,178 one might infer cycling preferences. When
dimensionality arises, those who resolve the identified issues along each
separate dimension in opposite fashion nonetheless share some common
value. Those occupying the lower left and upper right positions in Table 5
resolve in opposite fashion whether or not to condone (1) the adverse use of
race and (2) the benign use of race. Despite that, these two groups each
condone some use of race. By contrast, those in the lower right appear to
provide a partial victory to each other camp (not condoning adverse use of
race, favoring modern liberals, and not condoning benign use of race, favoring Jim Crow), yet thwart the common willingness of the remaining
groups to condone some use of race.
Although the details of the possible cycles are unimportant, each rests
on at least one contestable assumption. Here the assumption is that either
the Jim Crow or modern liberal positions might rank each other ahead of
color blindness to secure the lawful permissiveness of relying on race, hoping to defeat what each regards as the disfavored use of race politically.179
177

178
179

Cycling rests at the core of another social choice insight, namely Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem,
or simply Arrow’s Theorem. Arrow proved that any set of rules designed to avoid cycling when
transforming member inputs into collective outputs will necessarily violate one of several conditions that he considered essential to fair group decision making. For a detailed discussion, see
STEARNS, supra note 44, at 81–94.
Plausible does not mean irrefutable; cycles are often constructed with alternative sets of contestable, yet plausible, assumptions. For an illustration, see infra note 179.
Based on Table 5, we can construct either of two theoretical cycles over these three positions, (A)
Modern liberal, (B) Jim Crow, and (C) Color-blind. For a forward cycle, assume that modern
liberals believe that they can defeat adverse race-conscious laws politically, but fear a rule altogether banning benign race-conscious laws. If so their preferences are ABC. The positions allowing Jim Crow to rank BCA, and color-blind to rank CAB, are intuitive, and together generate
a cycle ApBpCpA where p means preferred by simple majority rule and each preference is based
on binary comparisons. To generate a reverse cycle, assume that the Jim Crow camp believes it
can defeat benign race-conscious measures politically, but fears the inability to pass adverse ones
(CBA); that the color-blind camp is more fearful of benign race-preferences, which are likely to
endure, than adverse ones, which they believe are sufficiently reprehensible that they will soon be
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Dimensionality, and cycling, arises not only from positions people hold
over choices, but also from background rules or conceptual framings that
affect those choices. In multicriterial decision making, background rules
combine with present options to forge dimensionality. Although all three
identified positions in Table 5 were once accepted as legitimate, at any given time, no more than two were viewed as dominant or creditworthy. During the Jim Crow era, the two dominant positions were Jim Crow and color
blindness. Today, with Jim Crow thankfully discredited, only color blindness and the modern liberal position are creditworthy.
Recall that with preferences P1: ABC, P2: BCA, P3: CAB, the group
will discover a cycle such that ApBpCpA, where p means preferred to by
simple majority rule. But even if a decision maker is removed, the cycle
can persist due to a combination of remaining preferences and governing
rules. Rules extend the preferences of past participants to the decisionmaking process. Indeed, rules are the formal extension past decision makers’ preferences.
If P3 plans to retire, she might encourage P1 and P2 to embrace a rule
that captures all or part of her preferences. Imagine the proposed rule provides that when choosing either between B and C or between B and A, P3’s
preferences, which least favor B, must be credited. The rule would discourage either P1 or P2, working with P3’s replacement, P4, from enacting either of their last choices.180 When combined with the ordinal preferences of
P1 and P2, the P3 rule replicates the earlier forward cycle.181 Although cycling is often viewed unfavorably, a cycle might be preferable to the risk that
P4 will team up with either P1 or P2 to produce P3’s least preferred result.182

180

181

182

politically defeated (BCA); and that the modern liberals intuitively prefer color blindness to Jim
Crow (ACB). The result is a reverse cycle CpBpApC. Notably, each ranking includes both
available orderings for each camp over the remaining options.
For a fascinating study of multicriterial decision making, see LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO
PERVERSE 25–31 (2011). In a fanciful illustration, Katz demonstrates how competing rules of
triage and free exchange (the Pareto principle) can create a confounding cycle for a physician
with time to treat only one of three patients involved in an automobile crash: one member of a
married couple, Al and Chloe, with Al suffering a relatively severe, and Chloe, a relatively minor,
injury, and another woman, Bea, with a moderate injury. If Al and Chloe prioritize Chloe’s
treatment over Al’s, then under the Pareto principle, Chloe is treated first. Under triage, Bea
takes priority over Chloe. And under triage again, Al takes priority over Bea. Then under Pareto, Chloe regains priority. This combination generates a treatment cycle: Chloe p Al p Bea p
Chloe, where p means preferred to under the conflicting multicriterial decision making of triage
and Pareto. This holds even if only a subset of patients participates in the formal decision making
at a given time.
This further explains the parallel logic of Arrow’s Theorem and multicriterial decision making.
For a discussion of multicriterial decision making, see Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717, 719–
20 (1979). For a discussion of Arrow’s Theorem, see STEARNS, supra note 44, at 81–94.
Thus, whereas Donald Saari ascribes cycling to the “curse of dimensionality,” depending on the
threatened outcome, some might instead regard dimensionality, and the resulting cycle, as a
blessing. DONALD G. SAARI, DISPOSING DICTATORS, DEMYSTIFYING VOTING PARADOXES:
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This dynamic can arise when present jurists frame equal protection options based upon conflicting understandings of discredited positions from
the past. Modern liberals infer from Jim Crow the need to avoid racial
subordination even if doing so means condoning occasional reliance on
race to benefit a once subordinated group. Color-blinds infer from Jim
Crow that regardless of how it is characterized, any reliance on race is
harmful and must be prohibited. Despite its general condemnation, Jim
Crow has forged ongoing multicriterial decision making.
2. Multicriterial Decision Making and the Complexity of Race: Fisher I and
Fisher II Revisited
Multicriterial decision making helps to explain the complexity of our
race jurisprudence. At the time that Harlan issued his Plessy dissent, racebased laws were obviously not intended to advance the interests of African
Americans.183 Justice Harlan’s color-blind Constitution operated against
the backdrop of Jim Crow, a regime in which the universe of race-advertent
laws perpetuated a racial caste system operating to the detriment of blacks.
Table 5 exposes how the relationship between the color-blind Constitution and race is shaped by dimensionality. Increased racial sensitivity has
placed stress on where the line should be drawn as to which legal policies
affecting race are or are not permitted. It is widely accepted that laws expressly relying on race to the detriment of blacks, and laws with the purpose
and effect of harming blacks, are presumed invalid and will be struck down.
Uncertainty concerning that line’s precise location, or the possibility of its
shift over time, does not remove the inevitable binary sorting along the vertical dimension in Table 5.
The horizontal dimension in Table 5 depicts the more recent analytical
category of race-specific laws designed to benefit African Americans. At
first blush, the modern liberal position (lower left) appears precisely opposite the discredited Jim Crow position (upper right). The analysis of dimensionality reveals why this is misleading. Although these two groups resolve
questions along each separate dimension in opposite fashion, they nonetheless hold in common condoning some use of race. This explains why Justice Thomas accuses modern liberals, despite their intentions, of perpetuating the evils of Jim Crow.184 By contrast, the color-blind (lower right)
position resolves partially in favor of each group, yet refuses to condone any

183
184

SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS 13–15 (2008) (ascribing cycling in group decision making to the “curse
of dimensionality”). Because preferences can cycle either forward or in reverse, the same phenomenon can arise if P1 and P2 reject the P3 position, albeit on different normative grounds. See supra
note 179 (illustrating forward and reverse cycles).
For a discussion of post-Civil War laws benefitting African Americans, see supra note 170, and
cites therein.
See supra note 156–59 and accompanying text.
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use of race, including those designed to benefit African Americans.
The discredited Jim Crow position continues to affect dimensionality,
much like the post-retirement P3 rule.185 Although modern liberals and
color-blinds remain influenced by its dangers, each reads the lessons of history differently and constructs different, and conflicting, rules as a result.
Our legal doctrines work reasonably well toward challenging race-specific
laws adversely affecting blacks along with race neutral laws with an adverse
purpose and effect. Such cases represent evolving choices along the dimension involving “condoning or not condoning adverse use of race.” As with
age, the dividing line along this single dimension has shifted over time.186
By contrast, the scheme works less well in confronting the alternative dimension of “condoning or not condoning the benign use of race,” which
like the hot air balloon or the number 2, forces a split in dimensionality.
Ironically, by forcing consideration of all race-based laws into a single
category, equal protection doctrine has prevented the meaningful assessment of race along a single dimension with two simple tiers, rational basis
and strict scrutiny. If adverse and benign use of race were treated as separate categories, a two-tiers system operating along each separate spectrum
based on the invidiousness or other difficulties associated with the racial
classification under review, would allow for a clean dividing line as to when
race may or may not be used in each category. Combining these as a single
category of race, however, forges dimensionality and thus creates the need
for a third tier. And because the most obvious candidate for a third tier—
intermediate scrutiny—has been disallowed,187 the result has been to force
a disingenuous applications of strict scrutiny in the context of race, thus
contributing to the anomalous 14325 sequence. In effect, we have forced
strict scrutiny to do the work of a different analytical test, with the consequence of having Category 4 (strict scrutiny lite) abut Category 1 (rational
basis) rather than Category 5 (strict scrutiny).
Imagine instead that the benign and adverse use of race were treated as
separate categories, and that, as under present doctrine, some reliance on
race is permitted. As applied to affirmative action in higher education, for
example, the split would place laws resembling the Harvard plan, which
Justice Powell favored in Board of Regents of the University of California v.

185

186

187

See supra Part II.F.1 (explaining cycling and dimensionality). As a result, it becomes possible to
construct a set of plausible, albeit contested, preferences from which to infer either a forward or
reverse cycle. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B (describing how the age that a child is considered to become an adult has
changed over time). For a counter-illustration in which age affects dimensionality, see supra note
133.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overturning Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), which had sustained benign race-based classification
under intermediate scrutiny).

1086

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:5

Bakke,188 the Michigan Law School plan sustained in Grutter v. Bollinger,189
and now the Texas plan sustained in Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher
II)190—plans that do not employ formal quotas and that use race as one factor among many as part of a claimed holistic admissions process—in the
rational basis bin for presumptively good laws. And it would place laws like
those struck down in Bakke and in Gratz v. Bollinger—plans that set up quotas, segregate files, or award fixed points based on race—in the strict scrutiny bin for presumptively bad laws.
The conflicting results in the Fisher I remand followed by the Fisher II affirmance highlight the analytical difficulty with the Court’s combined approach to race. To better appreciate these cases, some background will be
helpful. In Hopwood v. Texas,191 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit interpreted Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,192 a case that applied strict scrutiny in the context of a race-based set-aside program for federal contracting rather than affirmative action in higher education,193 as
demanding the application of strict scrutiny in its more traditional form for
all race-based classifications.194 The Hopwood Court thus applied traditional
strict scrutiny to strike down the University of Texas School of Law’s affirmative action plan. The University responded by implementing an admissions policy relying on holistic factors, without relying expressly on race,
as proxies for diversity. The state legislature responded by enacting a top
ten-percent law, guaranteeing qualified high school graduates who met certain criteria admission to any public state college, including the University
of Texas. Following Grutter, which sustained the University of Michigan
School of Law affirmative action program, and with the top ten-percent
plan already in place, the University of Texas adopted its revised holistic
race-conscious plan at issue in Fisher to ensure a “critical mass” of students,
including meaningful minority classroom enrollment.195
188
189
190
191
192
193

194
195

438 U.S. 265, 316–18 (1978).
539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003).
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
515 U.S. 200 (1996).
See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Adarand); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v.
United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 334–35 (2000) (positing that Justice Scalia joined the Adarand majority opinion despite fundamental disagreements to
create the necessary majority to overturn Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2013) (describing the history
of race-conscious admission policies at the University of Texas at Austin leading up to the program being challenged in Fisher I). Justice Kennedy described the challenged program as follows:
To implement the Proposal the University included a student’s race as a component of
the PAI [Personal Achievement Index] score, beginning with applicants in the fall of
2004. The University asks students to classify themselves from among five predefined racial categories on the application. Race is not assigned an explicit numerical value, but it
is undisputed that race is a meaningful factor.
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In Fisher I, Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority of seven on an eightmember Court, explained that the combined post-Hopwood regime improved overall racial diversity relative to the final year of the pre-Hopwood
regime, with the entering class being composed of 4.5% African Americans
and 16.9% Hispanics as compared with 4.1% African Americans and
14.5% Hispanics.196 The combined scheme, which the Fifth Circuit sustained largely based on Grutter, substantially improved minority enrollment.197 Justice Kennedy explained:
[The Fifth Circuit] held that Grutter required courts to give substantial deference
to the University, both in the definition of the compelling interest in diversity’s
benefits and in deciding whether its specific plan was narrowly tailored to
achieve its stated goal. Applying that standard, the court upheld the University’s admissions plan.198

Justice Kennedy observed that although the Grutter Court had deferred
to the Michigan Law School’s assertion that diversity was central to its educational mission, the application of strict scrutiny remained a judicial inquiry. He explained:
Narrow tailoring . . . requires that the reviewing court verify that it is “necessary” for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity. This involves a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could
achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications. Although
“[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative,” strict scrutiny does require a court to examine with care, and not
defer to, a university’s “serious, good faith consideration of workable raceneutral alternatives.” Consideration by the university is of course necessary,
but it is not sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny: The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce
the educational benefits of diversity. If “‘a nonracial approach . . . could promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense,’” then the university may not consider race. . . . [S]trict scrutiny imposes
on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial
classifications, that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.199

196
197

198
199

Id. at 2416 (2013).
Id.
Although the Fisher I Court did not recount admissions statistics under the new plan, the Fifth
Circuit stated:
In an entering class that was roughly the same size in 1998 as it was in 2008, the enrollment of African-American students doubled from 165 students to 335 students. Hispanic
enrollment increased approximately 1.5 times, from 762 students to 1,228 students.
Asian-American enrollment also increased nearly 10%, from 1,034 students to 1,126 students. By contrast, in 2004, the last year the Top Ten Percent Law operated without the
Grutter plan, fall enrollment included only 275 African Americans and 1,024 Hispanics.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 226 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2420 (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
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Justice Kennedy then explained the need for a remand:
Rather than perform this searching examination, however, the Court of
Appeals held petitioner could challenge only “whether [the University’s] decision to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.” And
in considering such a challenge, the court would “presume the University acted
in good faith” and place on petitioner the burden of rebutting that presumption.200

Perhaps the most striking feature of Fisher I is what Justice Kennedy did
not say. He did not suggest, as Justice Thomas had in Grutter,201 that the
University choose either to relinquish its elite status or its racial diversity.
And yet, he maintained that deferring to the University’s good faith judgment about how to balance these competing concerns—the deference that
Grutter afforded the University of Michigan Law School—was inconsistent
with strict scrutiny and, in fact, risked rendering strict scrutiny “feeble in
fact.”202 Although Justice Kennedy maintained that strict scrutiny should
be neither fatal nor feeble, he failed to offer a meaningful alternative, other
than implying by omission that the alternative is not intermediate scrutiny.
Following the Fisher I remand, the Fifth Circuit once more affirmed the
University of Texas plan against the equal protection challenge.203 When
Fisher II returned to the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy emerged at the
center of a seven-member Court.204 Justice Kennedy observed that the
record was devoid of specific details concerning students “admitted solely
based on their class rank” as opposed to “through holistic review.”205 He
further noted that additional fact-finding would not be productive given the
time line: the case had been in litigation for eight years, such “evidence has
little bearing on whether petitioner received equal treatment when her application was rejected in 2008,” and the claimant, Abigail Fisher, had long
since graduated.206 Rather than dismissing certiorari as improvidently
granted or based on mootness, however, Justice Kennedy went on to reject
the equal protection challenge to the combined Texas plan.
Justice Kennedy maintained that the Texas legislature could not be
faulted for enacting the ten-percent plan in the aftermath of Hopwood, given
its then understanding of equal protection doctrine. The greater challenge
was justifying the combined percentage plan with the race-explicit overlay.
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the combined impact had notably im200
201

202
203
204
205
206

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231–32, 236
(5th Cir. 2011)
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 361 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[T]he Law School should be forced to choose between its classroom aesthetic and its exclusionary admissions system—it cannot have it both ways.”).
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014).
See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text (describing the composition of the Fisher II Court).
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2209 (2016).
Id.
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proved the percentage attendance of minority students, observing that the
diversity goal involved not merely aggregate enrollments, but also specific
classroom settings.207 Justice Kennedy rejected Ms. Fisher’s argument that
the small incidence of reliance on race revealed it to be an unnecessary
means of achieving diversity.208 Here, Justice Kennedy appeared to contradict his own earlier analysis in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1,209 where he stated:
[I]t is noteworthy that the number of students whose assignment depends on
express racial classifications is limited. I join Part III-C of the Court’s opinion
because I agree that in the context of these plans, the small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends
through different means.210

By contrast, in Fisher II, Justice Kennedy concluded: “[I]t is not a failure of
narrow tailoring for the impact of racial consideration to be minor. The
fact that race consciousness played a role in only a small portion of admissions decisions should be a hallmark of narrow tailoring, not evidence of
unconstitutionality.”211
Justice Kennedy rejected the alternative methods that Ms. Fisher suggested as a means of minority outreach along with Justice Thomas’s alternative approach from Grutter,212 stating “Equal Protection . . . does not force
universities to choose between a diverse student body and a reputation for
academic excellence,”213 the very framing that led to the deferential—or
“feeble”—approach advanced in Grutter.
The more difficult claim involved Ms. Fisher’s argument that the university could increase diversity through a stepped-up percentage plan as an
alternative to express reliance on race. In rejecting this analysis, Justice
Kennedy avoided the virtual elephant in the room, namely the different
types of students that the university is likely to attract through these two
components of its combined admission regime: the percentage plan, on one
hand, and the race-specific admissions, on the other. Instead, Justice Kennedy eschewed the issue by accepting Justice Ginsburg’s Fisher I analysis.
Justice Kennedy stated: “As an initial matter, petitioner overlooks the fact
that the Top Ten Percent Plan, though facially neutral, cannot be understood apart from its basic purpose, which is to boost minority enrollment.
207
208
209
210
211
212

213

Id. at 2212.
Id.
551 U.S. 701 (2007). For a more detailed analysis of Parents Involved, see supra notes 156–59 and
accompanying text.
Id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212. I thank Peter J. Artese for bringing this to my attention.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 361–62 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (positing that equal protection disallows the University of Michigan School of Law to
couple elite admissions criteria with race-based exceptions to satisfy its twin goals of prestige and
diversity).
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213.
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Percentage plans are ‘adopted with racially segregated neighborhoods and
schools front and center stage.’”214
Justice Kennedy concluded, “petitioner cannot assert simply that increasing the University’s reliance on a percentage plan would make its admissions policy more race neutral.”215 He added: “Even if, as a matter of
raw numbers, minority enrollment would increase under such a regime, petitioner would be hard-pressed to find convincing support for the proposition that college admissions would be improved if they were a function of
class rank alone.”216 Justice Kennedy closed by speculating about the potential missed applicants Ms. Fisher’s approach might entail: “a talented young
biologist who struggled to maintain above-average grades in humanities
classes,”217 or “a student whose freshman-year grades were poor because of
a family crisis but who got herself back on track in the last three years of
school, only to find herself just outside the top decile of her class.”218
For purposes of the tiers analysis, it is important to parse two important
attributes of Justice Kennedy’s Fisher II analysis. First, perhaps unwittingly,
Justice Kennedy flipped strict scrutiny on its head. He did so by positing
that petitioner’s argument failed because Fisher could not prove that a raceneutral method—a stepped up percentage plan—would result in qualitatively better admitted students. Of course under strict scrutiny—the oldfashioned kind—the state has the burden to prove narrow tailoring. Justice
Kennedy instead has placed the burden on Ms. Fisher, the challenger, to
prove that a more narrowly tailored program would succeed just as well.
As we have previously seen, when the outcomes fall within a gray area, one
that neither side can prove or disprove, the allocation of the burden of
proof controls the outcome.219
Second and perhaps more notably, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion in
a manner that avoided the real stakes of the case. The issue here is not
merely the raw number, or even percentage, of minority students admitted
through the two separate parts of the combined Texas plan. Rather, it is the
probable different nature of the students admitted under each part. The
University of Texas officials were certainly well aware that the top percentage plan does not necessarily bring to the University of Texas, a highly elite
institution, those students who—although falling below the ten percent
threshold—have high stakes test scores on the SATs and ACTs that demonstrate greater academic promise, and thus a higher likelihood of eventual

214
215
216
217
218
219

Id. (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra part I.A.
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academic success.220 To allow the University to accomplish its goal of admitting these more highly qualified minority students, Justice Kennedy effectively flipped the burden of proof onto the challenger, thereby extending
deference to the University, just as he criticized the Grutter Court for having
done in his Fisher I opinion. In doing so, Justice Kennedy rested on the
proposition that equal protection does not force upon the University of Texas the choice of diversity or prestige. But in allowing the University to have
the cake it is eating, while also claiming to apply strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy reconceived that test to do the work of rational basis review. Once
more the result is to flip the sequence 12345 to 14325.221
This doctrinal inversion was not inevitable. Even if one rejects Justice
Stevens’s claim in his Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena dissent that strict scrutiny is unnecessary to distinguish a “No Trespassing sign” from a “welcome
mat,”222 it is clear that those who embrace the modern liberal position are
answering the underlying questions as to when race is or is not permitted differently from those who once embraced Jim Crow. If the Court acknowledged this distinction, thereby aligning its tiers doctrine with the dimensionality of the underlying case law, the conventional two-tier approach would
succeed, with a line separating permissible from impermissible conduct
drawn for each case category: laws designed to benefit minorities, on one
hand, and laws designed to subordinate them, on the other. If, instead, all
race cases are forced into the same doctrinal bin of strict scrutiny and yet
some of those challenged laws are to be sustained, then we need a mechanism with which to separately handle cases relying on race in opposite ways
based on whether the challenged law seeks to benefit or to harm African
Americans as a class. The obvious method, limited to the category of benign race-based classifications, is to allow a third tier such as intermediate
scrutiny. Despite the Fisher I remand, this is the inevitable lesson of Fisher II.
Although the case law has produced related anomalies associated with
the stricter version of rational basis scrutiny,223 the dimensionality problem
implicating a third tier is endemic to race. The historical role of race within
our history and constitutional doctrine has given color blindness a distinct
normative status that appears to lack a counterpart of sex- or sexualorientation-blindness.224 Whereas race implicates the two dimensions of
antidiscrimination (using race as a basis for classification) and anti220

221
222
223
224

Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2233–34 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing the University of Texas’s arguments
that “holistic admits” had higher SAT scores and noting that “[i]n addition to using socioeconomic status to falsely denigrate the minority students admitted through the Top Ten Percent
Plan, UT also argues that such students are academically inferior”).
See supra Introduction.
515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The consistency that the Court espouses
would disregard the difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”).
See supra Part I.C.2; infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.B (distinguishing color- and sex-blindness).
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subordination (treating racial minorities disadvantageously), these other
case law categories implicate only the anti-subordination dimension.225
Treating race as a meta-category, thereby collapsing these dimensions and
subjecting all race cases to strict scrutiny, has also produced a notorious
anomaly: although the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to end
longstanding adverse treatment of blacks at the hands of the state, the differential standards for race and sex has allowed the Court to sustain laws
expressly designed to benefit women but has disallowed it to sustain laws
designed to benefit racial minorities.
III. THE PROBLEM OF TIERS REVISITED: RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
This part applies the preceding analysis to several important remaining
issues implicating race, gender, and sexual orientation, including revisiting
the Obergefell decision.
A. Dimensionality and Race: Race Neutral Laws and Antisubordination
We begin with the problem of adverse race-neutral laws and then discuss laws that although not racially discriminatory nonetheless subordinate
based on race.
1. The Problem of Adverse Race-Neutral Laws
In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to a race-neutral English literacy exam used in hiring District
of Columbia police officers.226 Although the policy disproportionately disqualified African American applicants, the Supreme Court sustained it
against an equal protection challenge applying rational basis scrutiny. Writing for a majority, Justice White determined that because the program was
motivated by the legitimate purpose of increasing the communicative skills
in a workforce valuing such skills, the differential impact did not trigger
heightened scrutiny.227 The Court further rejected a purpose-and-effects
analysis, observing that the police department had refuted the claimed illicit
purpose through its affirmative efforts to recruit minority officers.228 The
Court applied similar reasoning in two controversial subsequent cases.
In United States v. Armstrong, the Court rejected a claim of selective prosecution that resulted in disparate sentencing for crack cocaine, a predominantly

225
226
227
228

See infra Part III.A.2 (distinguishing antidiscrimination and anti-subordination as related to race).
426 U.S. 229, 232, 239 (1976).
Id. at 245–46.
Id. at 235–36.
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black offense, versus powder cocaine, a predominantly white offense.229
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority, applied rational basis scrutiny, reasoning that all races did not commit the same offenses proportionately
to their demographic representation. He observed, for example, that whereas crack cocaine is a disproportionately black offense, prostitution and child
pornography tend to be disproportionately white offenses.230
And in McCleskey v. Kemp, Chief Justice Rehnquist, again writing for a majority, rejected an equal protection challenge premised on the famous David
Baldus study demonstrating the disparate application of the death sentence
based on the races of the perpetrator and victim.231 A black murderer killing
a white victim was more than four times as likely to receive the death penalty
than any other combination, and overall, black defendants stood a far greater
likelihood of receiving the death penalty than white defendants.232
Although facially neutral, the challenged laws in Armstrong and McCleskey
were obviously not benign in the sense of affirmatively seeking to benefit
blacks. Rather, the government defended these policies as furthering some
non-racial objective in spite of the policy’s adverse racial impact. These cases illustrate another round in a Red Queen game involving: (1) race-specific
laws harming blacks; (2) race-neutral laws with the purpose and effect of
harming blacks; and now (3) race-neutral laws claimed to serve an independent benign purpose, but with an adverse consequence on blacks. Thus
far, the Court has drawn the line along this analytical dimension placing
Categories 1 and 2 on one side (prohibited), and Category 3 on the other
(permitted). Whether the resulting deference in Category 3 cases, to which
rational basis scrutiny applies, will continue, or whether the Court will, over
time, throw more such cases in the presumptive bad pile remains to be
seen. However such future cases are resolved, they do not create a dimensionality problem inasmuch as the challenged laws, although racially neutral, are not intended to benefit racial minorities.
2. The Problem of Nondiscriminatory Laws That Subordinate Based on Race
In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a state antimiscegenation statute.233 As previously noted, some media commentators
viewed same-sex marriage, and thus Obergefell, as a natural extension of Loving.234 Anti-miscegenation laws criminalized the conduct of both parties to
229
230
231
232
233
234

517 U.S. 456, 469–70 (1996).
Id. at 469.
481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987).
Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
See supra Introduction. The Obergefell Court cited Loving for the discussion of marriage as a fundamental right, not for its suspect classification analysis. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2599 (2015); see also Adam Liptak, A Steady Path to the Justices: Gay Marriage Cases Building Momentum,
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an interracial marriage, and thus applied equally to the white and black
spouses.235 The analytical difficulty, therefore, is that such statutes do not
discriminate on the basis of race. They instead discriminate along the separate dimension distinguishing same-race (treated favorably) and mixed-race
(treated unfavorably) couples. Of course this does not make such laws benign; they obviously are not, which is the point. Historically discrimination
correlated with presumptively bad laws, and conversely, non-discrimination
correlated with presumptively good laws. These intuitions are tested not
only in the context of benign race-based laws, which discriminate favorably
to blacks, but also in the context of anti-miscegenation laws, which discriminate along a separate dimension but subordinate based on race.
Writing in Loving for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren struck
down the law, which was obviously designed to harm blacks and other racial minorities by protecting, in effect, the white race from corruption of
blood. As Justice Stewart, who also joined the majority opinion, aptly observed in a separate concurrence, it is sufficient to say that a law that criminalizes based on the race of the actors cannot stand.236 And this is true
even if the law discriminated along a different dimension.
Loving infuses anti-subordination as an independent principle into equal
protection doctrine. Setting aside benign racial preferences, laws that discriminate based on race typically also subordinate based on race. Loving
demonstrates how a law can subordinate without discriminating, thus
thwarting the conventional assumption that antidiscrimination and antisubordination operate in tandem. The case helps to explain why when we
combine the principles of antidiscrimination and anti-subordination in the
context of race, we have a true dimensionality problem, whereas outside
that context, these two principles coalesce thereby flattening dimensionality. Consider Table 6 below.

235

236

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2014, at A1, A12 (connecting Loving and Obergefell prior to oral argument in
Obergefell).
The case facts were more complex. The statute banned intermarriages between minorities and
whites, but not between minorities. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, declared that
feature irrelevant, holding the challenged law is patently unconstitutional “even assuming an
even-handed state purpose to protect the ‘integrity’ of all races.” Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12 n.11
(1967). The text assesses the challenged law as characterized by the Loving Court.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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TABLE 6
DISCRIMINATION, SUBORDINATION, AND DIMENSIONALITY

Racial Subordination Condoned
Racial Subordination Not Condoned

Racial Discrimination
Condoned

Racial Discrimination
Not Condoned

Jim Crow

Null Set

Modern Liberal

Modern Conservative

In Table 6, the two critical dimensions involve whether racial discrimination and racial subordination are or are not condoned. The null set, or
position no one would logically assume, is not condoning discrimination,
but condoning subordination (upper right). The Jim Crow position, upper
left, condones both. The modern liberal position condones affirmative action, thus allowing benign discrimination, but does not condone subordination. The modern conservative position, or color blindness, neither condones racial discrimination nor subordination other than as the unintended
consequence of laws promoting independent benign goals. Although the
Jim Crow and modern conservative positions resolve the two critical issues
in opposite fashion, the modern liberal position does not split the difference
along a single dimension. Instead, the modern conservative and Jim Crow
positions both oppose condoning the benign use of race, albeit for different
reasons.
Dimensionality flattens, however, when we eliminate discrimination
consistently with Chief Justice Warren’s admittedly forced construction of
the challenged statute.237 The normative attachment to color blindness no
longer forces a separate dimension. Instead, the binary split, condoning or
not condoning racial subordination, rests along one dimension, shown in
Table 7. The Loving Court unanimously threw the subordinating antimiscegenation statute into the presumptively bad law bin, and struck it
down, with the modern liberals and modern conservatives on the same side,
opposing Jim Crow.

237

See supra note 235. For presentation purposes, this table is inverted relative to Table 6, with the
vertical axis now cast horizontally.
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TABLE 7
LOVING IN ONE DIMENSION
Conservative/Liberal
Loving Result
Prohibit Subordination

Jim Crow
Anti-miscegenation Result
Allow Subordination

B. Dimensionality and Gender
The general absence of a sex-blindness equivalent to color blindness
supports the intuition that gender cases are more likely to rest along a single
analytical dimension. Within our jurisprudential tradition, along with Loving, gender-based equal protection cases center on anti-subordination, not
antidiscrimination.
The challenge of gender-based classifications is that there are times
when the sexes are situated differently in relevant ways and, as a result,
when the analogy between race and sex breaks down. To begin thinking
about gender and dimensionality, reconsider Table 5, this time using gender, not race, as informing the relevant categories.
TABLE 8
GENDER AND DIMENSIONALITY

Adverse Gender
Classifications
Permitted
Adverse Gender
Classifications
Not Permitted

Benign Gender Classifications Benign Gender Classifications
Permitted
Prohibited
Pre-Reed v. Reed restrictions
Null Set
on participation in bar, estate
planning, and jury service
Modern Liberal View

Sex-blindness?

Prior to two landmark gender-distinction cases, the Court routinely sustained laws distinguishing men and women based on then-dominant social
mores concerning sex roles. This began to change in Reed v. Reed,238 which
struck down a ban on women administering estates, and in Frontiero v. Richardson,239 which struck down a presumption of family benefits for enlisted men
but not women in the military. Classic illustrations of earlier treatments in238
239

404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971).
411 U.S. 677, 679 (1973).
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cluded laws preventing women not married to the proprietor from bartending240 and rendering jury service voluntary for women but not men.241
In Reed and Frontiero, both of which purported to apply rational basis
scrutiny (of the “plus” or “with teeth” variety) while striking the challenged
laws down, the Court began developing what we can now view as the modern liberal position. That position no longer condones sex-based distinctions premised on “overbroad generalizations” about the sexes.242 In Craig
v. Boren,243 the non-intoxicating beer case, Justice Brennan articulated what
has become known as “intermediate scrutiny.” The test states: “To withstand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.”244
The intermediate tier returns us to the analysis of dimensionality. As in
Table 5, the lower right and upper left positions in Table 8 embrace seemingly opposite views respecting the permissibility of challenged laws, this
time harming or benefiting women. But there is a critical difference. In
contrast with race, there isn’t a generally accepted sex-blind position within
our jurisprudential tradition.245 Instead, the conservative and liberal positions on gender agree that sex-based distinctions can be drawn but disagree
on the permissibility line.

240

241
242
243
244
245

Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465–66 (1948). The Court had similarly rejected due process
challenges to laws limiting the hours, or imposing minimum wages, for working women despite
evidence that such laws undermined employment prospects for unskilled women as compared
with similarly situated men. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416–17, 423 (1908) (distinguishing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and sustaining state law setting ten-hour
workday for women), overruled by Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 552–53, 562 (1923)
(relying on substantive due process to strike down minimum wage for women).
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60–61 (1961).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
429 U.S. 190 (1976). For a more detailed discussion, see supra Part I.C.3.
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
Of course sex-blindness does exist as a theoretical position and also as policy in some settings.
See, e.g., John Tagliabue, A School’s Big Lesson Begins with Dropping Personal Pronouns, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2012, at A8 (discussing Egalia, a preschool in Stockholm, Sweden that eschews gendered pronouns, “him” or “her,” in favor of “friend,” and that rejects any suppositions about sex
roles).
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TABLE 9
SEX-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION WITH FLATTENED DIMENSIONALITY
Rational Basis
in Fact
Easy Cases to Sustain
Benign Sex-Based Laws

Intermediate Scrutiny
Intermediate Scrutiny
as a Placeholder
Hard Cases

Strict Scrutiny
in Fact
Easy Cases to Strike
Down
Adverse Sex-Based Laws

When challenged laws draw lines based on gender, as in the prior examples, or are formally gender neutral but have gender-based effects, the
analysis generally involves whether the challenged laws do or do not subordinate women.246 Table 9 thus reveals the real purpose that intermediate
scrutiny serves. In the context of sex-based classifications, the easy cases
occupy the opposite extremes along one dimension. We know that simple
exclusions or disadvantageous treatment of women based on antiquated notions about the gender roles are easily struck down. These cases are subject
to intermediate scrutiny in name, and to strict scrutiny in fact. Conversely,
while there are few easily sustained sex-based distinctions, there are some.
For a long time, separate bathrooms were viewed, perhaps wrongly in hindsight, as a trivial example.247 Others involve policies that recognize genuine
sex differences, for example, who makes the final decision to terminate a
pregnancy;248 same-sex rooming assignments in state institutions of higher
246

247

248

See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 146–47 (1980) (striking down a Missouri workers’ compensation scheme specially requiring proof of dependency prior to widower,
but not widow, receiving benefits); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 202, 206–09 (1977) (relying on the anti-subordination principle to strike down federal program which afforded widows
automatic benefits but conditioned widower benefits on proof of dependency). In both cases, the
difficulty was not gender discrimination. Both the deceased woman paying contributions and the
widower seeking benefits were harmed. Rather, the discrimination favored traditional families by
enacting a preference for husbands as primary breadwinners, in contrast with those in which the
breadwinning responsibilities rested with the wife or were shared. In that manner, these challenged laws violated the anti-subordination principle.
Pending challenges by transgender individuals to gender-specific bathrooms appear to be changing this. See generally Catherine Jean Archibald, Transgender Bathroom Rights, 24 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 1 (2016); Catherine Jean Archibald, Transgender Student in Maine May Use Bathroom That
Matches Gender Identity—Are Co-Ed Bathrooms Next?, 83 UMKC L. REV. 57 (2014); Rachel E. Moffitt, Note, Keeping the John Open to Jane: How California’s Bathroom Bill Brings Transgender Rights out of the
Water Closet, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 475 (2015).
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894–96 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy,
& Souter, JJ., joint opinion) (holding that a pregnant woman cannot be required to inform her
husband of a planned abortion); see also Mary Ziegler, Abortion and the Constitutional Right (Not) to
Procreate, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1263 (2014) (discussing history of spousal consent laws as part of
larger inquiry into abortion rights framework and assisted reproductive technology).
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learning, in the military, or in other venues where government provides
housing to non-married persons; and as seen in Nguyen and Morales-Santana,
whether to permit the government to prioritize based on the parent’s sex
when a non-marital overseas-born offspring of only one U.S. citizen-parent
later seeks citizenship.249
Intermediate scrutiny might serve as a placeholder for difficult cases.
And yet, line drawing difficulties, and even shifting lines over time, do not
force problems of dimensionality.250 To illustrate, consider two muchcriticized sex-based equal protection cases. In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme Court held that the state did not violate equal protection in denying
insurance benefits for pregnancy because the denial is not gender-based.251
The second decision, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, involved
a challenge to a program benefitting veterans in hiring, which, due to the
history of military service, disproportionately benefitted men.252
Although each challenged law was technically gender neutral, each also
appears to have profound gender-based effects. The Court sustained both
policies, and the question is whether intermediate scrutiny is doing any
work in reaching those results. Geduldig appears problematic in that men
obviously cannot become pregnant,253 and Feeney is disturbing because the
history of military service affects men differently from women, thereby testing gender neutrality.
What makes these cases hard is not dimensionality. It is instead the difficulty of line drawing. Although the policies at issue in Geduldig and Feeney
affect men and women differently, the effects are subtler than first appears.
Consider pregnancy benefits. Although only women become pregnant, only a relatively small number of women will do so during any given coverage
period. The beneficiaries of the pregnancy exclusion include persons
whose contributions are reduced as a result of the exclusion, and that includes women who will not become pregnant. Notably, however, it does
not include all men. For men whose wives are covered on their policies and
become pregnant during the coverage period, the exclusion is also financially detrimental.
249

250
251
252
253

For a discussion of Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), see supra Part I.C.3. For a discussion of Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017), and United States v. FloresVillar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), see supra note 115.
See supra Part II.A.
417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974).
442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979).
Justice Ginsburg unsuccessfully argued for revisiting the Geduldig holding in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, maintaining that pregnancy discrimination “[b]y definition . . . discriminates on
account of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female
from the male.” 556 U.S. 30, 55 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161–62 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Except for seahorses. See JOAN ROUGHGARDEN, EVOLUTION’S RAINBOW: DIVERSITY, GENDER, AND
SEXUALITY IN NATURE AND PEOPLE 45 (2004).
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Feeney also appears problematic because we could say that wives of former
military service members who benefit from the challenged policy do so along
with their husbands, and husbands of women excluded from such positions
due to the military benefit are burdened along with their wives. Although the
burdens and benefits are not gender specific, the challenged scheme reinforces stereotypical notions about which spouse is responsible for providing housing and related benefits. The point here is not to resolve these cases. Rather,
it is to show that the results are contestable because societal understanding of
gender roles is evolving along the dimension of anti-subordination.
C. Dimensionality and Sexual Orientation: Obergefell Revisited
Following Romer v. Evans,254 and Lawrence v. Texas,255 but before Obergefell v.
Hodges,256 the Supreme Court took up two cases that implicated same-sex
marriage. In Hollingsworth v. Perry,257 which presented a challenge to California
Proposition 108 banning same-sex marriage, Chief Justice Roberts denied the
initiative sponsors standing to challenge the California Supreme Court ruling
striking the initiative down.258 In dissent, Justice Kennedy argued in favor of
standing, preferring to have the Court address the merits of the same-sex marriage ban.259 In United States v. Windsor,260 issued the same day, Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority, struck down Section 3 of DOMA, thereby invalidating federal laws that failed to recognize state-sanctioned same-sex
marriage.261 The most compelling reading of the combined cases was that a
majority comprising Justice Kennedy and the liberal wing of the Court supported striking down bans on same-sex marriage, but that some coalition
members preferred to await a broader societal consensus.262 Subsequent legal
developments appear to have vindicated that reading.263
The harder prediction—the one that appears to have evaded most ob254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262

263

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
539 U.S. 558; see also supra notes 83–94 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between Romer, Lawrence, and Obergefell).
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
Id. at 2659.
Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Id. at 2683, 2695–96. For a more detailed discussion of Windsor, see supra Part I.C.2.
At least it seemed clear to this observer. See Stearns, Grains of Sand, supra note 81, at 393–98 (positing that the liberal Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, who along with conservative Justice
Scalia, joined Chief Justice Robert’s majority opinion denying standing in Hollingsworth, likely
preferred to await further consensus in favor of same-sex marriage, and that Justice Kennedy,
who dissented, would likely have struck down the same-sex marriage ban had the Court reached
the merits).
For a comprehensive account of the lower court case law at the time of the Obergefell decision, see
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 app. A (2015) (listing citations of state and federal judicial
opinions on the issue of same-sex marriage).
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servers—was the eventual basis for the ruling. Commentators generally anticipated three possible rationales, of which two seemed more likely. Justice
Kennedy chose a fourth. The first option was to extend the animus analysis
from Romer, striking the same-sex marriage ban without declaring gays and
lesbians a suspect or quasi-suspect class. The second option was to treat
bans on same-sex marriage as a form of gender-based classification, thereby
declaring sexual minorities a quasi-suspect class. The third, somewhat less
likely, rationale was to treat bans on same-sex marriage as analogous to anti-miscegenation laws, thus declaring minority sexual orientation a suspect
class.264 These approaches corresponded with a progression from rational
basis (of the animus variety) to intermediate scrutiny (in its stricter form) to
strict scrutiny (in its conventional, fatal form). With the benefit of hindsight,
it is easier to see why Justice Kennedy instead eschewed suspect classification analysis, other than as the somewhat imprecise basis for an alternative
holding, instead resting primarily on due process and finding same-sex
marriage a fundamental right.
The likely reason that commentators missed the mark on the eventual
basis for the holding is that they were struggling for an approach that would
minimize the probability of identifying minority sexual orientation as a
quasi-suspect or suspect classification. Viewed along the dimension of antisubordination, the clearest approach to resolving the case was to find that
such laws were subject to strict scrutiny. Either of the rejected alternatives—the animus form of rational basis or stricter intermediate scrutiny—
would have accomplished that other than in name. Indeed, this is why
treating same-sex marriage bans as a variation on anti-miscegenation laws
seemed implausible: such a ruling would have bluntly added minority sexual status to the narrow grouping of suspect classifications. And yet, Justice
Kennedy managed to accomplish the same result of functionally applying
strict scrutiny without formally declaring sexual minorities a suspect or even
quasi-suspect class and without mentioning the applicable tier.
Although Justice Kennedy nominally avoided tiers altogether, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing the principal dissent, made plain that the majority
opinion presumed strict scrutiny.265 Not surprisingly, Justice Kennedy offered no refutation. When the Court finds a fundamental right, laws that
interfere with it must pass strict scrutiny to survive. In effect, Justice Kennedy managed to raise the tier of scrutiny to the highest level without having to create a new suspect classification in doing so. That stringent test
264

265

See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting that racial classifications in criminal statutes
were “especially suspect” in light of the Equal Protection Clause); see also supra note 235 and accompanying text.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“And a State’s decision to maintain the
meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be
called irrational.”).
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will govern future challenges to such laws.
Justice Kennedy’s approach also carried additional benefits. The primary difficulty with animus analysis is that it would have resulted in casting
aspersions on those opposing the extension of marriage to same-sex couples. Such a ruling would have implied that those denying the extension of
the right to marry to same-sex couples had exhibited an animus against
gays and lesbians, a politically unpopular group. For Justice Kennedy the
difficulty harkened back to his opening remark at oral argument: whatever
the merits of the policy question, many individuals long embraced a traditional view of marriage, one that he claimed had stood for millennia.266
The fundamental rights analysis instead allowed Justice Kennedy to
claim respect for the dignity both of same-sex couples, who were previously
denied a right of access to marriage, and of those who held traditional views
of marriage for religious or other reasons. Even if critics, including the dissenting justices, questioned the sincerity of this position, the combination
proved central to Justice Kennedy’s opinion.
Consider this passage from the majority opinion:
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that,
by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central
to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family
structure they have long revered. The same is true of those who oppose samesex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex
marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open
and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to
bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples
of the opposite sex.267

Perhaps the Court might have broadened the animus concept to include indifference to the harms imposed on politically unpopular groups,
rather than hostility toward such groups. Such a conceptual broadening
might have allowed Kennedy to invalidate the same-sex marriage ban even
if it persisted in spite of, rather than because of, its adverse effects to sexual
minorities. The difficulty, however, is that this approach would have
broadened the narrow limits of the animus category of rationality review,
making it hard to predict when laws enacted or retained for claimed benign, but contested, reasons would be sustained. By instead relying primarily on due process, Justice Kennedy was able to thread the needle and to
claim, at least formally, respect for the sincerely held views of those on both
sides of this divisive issue.
266
267

Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2548 (2015) (No. 14-556).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
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Thus Justice Kennedy continued:
The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but
rights come not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that
remains urgent in our own era. Many who deem same-sex marriage to be
wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But
when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy,
the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal
treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.268

In effect, Justice Kennedy took the position that although we should respect
those holding competing views of same-sex marriage, due process cannot
condone both positions without undermining the fundamental rights of
those who are burdened.
To be sure, Chief Justice Roberts, writing in dissent, construed the majority ruling as condemning those opposed to same-sex marriage.269 Thus
he stated:
Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’s decision is the extent to
which the majority feels compelled to sully those on the other side of the debate. The majority offers a cursory assurance that it does not intend to disparage people who, as a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-sex marriage.
That disclaimer is hard to square with the very next sentence, in which the majority explains that “the necessary consequence” of laws codifying the traditional definition of marriage is to “demea[n] or stigmatiz[e]” same-sex couples.
The majority reiterates such characterizations over and over. By the majority’s
account, Americans who did nothing more than follow the understanding of
marriage that has existed for our entire history—in particular, the tens of mil268
269

Id. at 2602.
More generally, the Chief Justice claimed that the majority decision fell within the tradition of
the generally discredited decision, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice didn’t disavow fundamental rights analysis altogether, but rather chastised the majority for its failure to abide the admonition to ground
identified rights in history and tradition. Id. at 2616, 2618, 2620–21 (arguing that by defining the
right as marriage rather than same-sex marriage, the majority has effectively overruled Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)); see also id. at 2640–41 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that
the finding of a fundamental right to same-sex marriage is contrary to Glucksberg because it is not
a right grounded in history and tradition). The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that it
does not overrule its own precedents by implication. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a
case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling
its own decisions.”). The different contexts of Glucksburg and Obergefell—the right to die and the
right to same sex marriage—would readily allow a future Court to distinguish these holdings.
The Chief Justice further argued that the claimed right could equally extend to plural marriage,
although he also suggested that the two claims could be plausibly distinguished on other grounds.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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lions of people who voted to reaffirm their States’ enduring definition of marriage—have acted to “lock . . . out,” “disparage,” “disrespect and subordinate,”
and inflict “[d]ignitary wounds” upon their gay and lesbian neighbors.270

Although the Court certainly took sides, Justice Kennedy’s due process
analysis allowed him to claim respect for the views of those supporting or
opposing same-sex marriage. That feat would have been nearly impossible
to accomplish based on a ruling resting on grounds of animus. An animus
ruling would also have required rejecting each proffered rationale for the
limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. This includes intuitions
about traditional cultural mores and even possible opposite-sex complementariness in child rearing to the extent that those opposing the claimed
right view marriage and child rearing as linked.271 The due process analysis
appeared to avoid these difficulties, while at the same time elevating, in effect, the level of review to strict scrutiny.
The most plausible alternative rationale would have equated equal protection analysis of sexual orientation and gender. Despite its intuitive appeal, treating a ban on same-sex marriage as an instance of gender discrimination implicates an analytical puzzle. The argument for this position is
that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples allows a woman to marry a
man but disallows a man to marry a man, thus discriminating based on

270
271

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Opposite sex complementarity implicates the much-contested literature on the possible biological
bases, as opposed to strictly cultural bases, for brain-sex differences. For literature supporting
claims to a biological basis for such differences, see generally, for example, SIMON BARONCOHEN, THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE MALE AND FEMALE BRAIN
(2003) (associating different distributions of skills, based on gender, along the axes of empathy
and systemization); Debra Soh, No, the Google Manifesto Isn’t Sexist or Anti-Diversity. It’s Science, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/no-the-googlemanifesto-isnt-sexist-or-anti-diversity-its-science/article35903359/?service=amp (including links
to relevant studies.). For literature refuting such claims, or arguing that such claims are overblown as causal determinants for sex-based patterns of observed differences in behavior, see
CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND NEUROSEXISM
CREATE DIFFERENCE (2010) (expounding a critique of the brain-sex dichotomy thesis); Dhruv
Marwha et al., Meta-Analysis Reveals a Lack of Sexual Dimorphism in Human Amygdala Volume, 147
NEUROIMAGE 282 (2017) (reviewing meta-analysis of fMRI studies). Resolving this scientific debate is well beyond the scope of this Article.
One related context in which such preferences are playing out is adoption proceedings. For
illustrations of state laws favoring opposite-sex marriages in adoption proceedings, see, for example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726a (repealed 2013) (“[T]he Commissioner of Children and
Families or a child-placing agency may consider the sexual orientation of the prospective adoptive or foster parent or parents when placing a child for adoption or in foster care.”); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (Supp. 2016) (“Adoptions by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”). In
2011 the Catholic Church withdrew its adoption services from Illinois after determining its agencies could no longer favor married couples. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 1417, 1447 (2012) (noting that many Catholic groups were “shedding their adoption services” in response to the fact that they would not be exempted from a law that required them to
consider same-sex couples).
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gender. The difficulty arises at the level of formal equality: the same restriction allows a man to marry a woman but disallows a woman to marry a
woman. So viewed, laws banning same-sex marriage are formally gender
neutral inasmuch as they apply equally to both men and women. Although
avoiding the gender analogy directly, Justice Kennedy implicitly recognized
the difficulty, thereby focusing instead on the subordinating effects of the
law’s different treatment of same sex (disfavored) and opposite sex (favored)
couples.272
As seen most clearly in Loving, formal non-discrimination (or formal
neutrality) does not resolve the ultimate question of constitutional permissibility. Instead it forces consideration of whether the restriction falls on the
wrong side of the analytical dimension of anti-subordination. The most
straightforward equal protection analysis in Obergefell might have been to
define minority sexual orientation as a suspect classification, thus applying
strict scrutiny, and putting same-sex marriage bans into the presumptive
bad law bin. The Court was clearly reticent to add to the list of such classifications, and so it accomplished this result through a ruling based on due
process.
Even so, Justice Kennedy linked the due process and equal protection
rationales:
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a
profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in
liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts
and are not always coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive
as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause
may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and
comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification
and definition of the right. This interrelation of the two principles furthers our
understanding of what freedom is and must become.273

By focusing on the relationship between the two clauses, but resting
primarily on due process, Justice Kennedy was able to offer a foundation in
the equal protection doctrine that did not rest on finding minority sexual
orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect class. The dimension along which
the Court effectively ruled was anti-subordination, but the Court nonetheless placed the ban on same-sex marriage on the offending side without
formally entrenching the decision in the nuances of tiers analysis. As this
Article has shown, however, avoiding a discussion of tiers does not elimi-

272

273

See supra note 268 and accompanying text (reflecting Kennedy’s concern that bans on same-sex
marriage “disparage their choices and diminish their personhood”). For a related discussion in
the context of employee benefits, see supra note 246 and accompanying text (striking down federal
program affording widows automatic benefits, but conditioning widower benefits on proof of dependency, and striking Missouri workers’ compensation scheme specially requiring proof of dependency prior to widower, but not widow, receiving benefits).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03 (citations omitted).
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nate the functions that tiers serve. The effect of Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell
opinion is unambiguous: laws denying access to marriage by same-sex couples will now be subject to strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The tiers of scrutiny doctrines have been widely condemned for producing dissatisfying results. Commentators have found the doctrines muddled
and their applications disingenuous. This Article has offered a different
way to think about the problem. By focusing on the implications of dimensionality for equal protection cases involving race, gender, and sexual orientation, the analysis reveals the very limited circumstances in which a third
tier is likely to prove helpful. Removing clutter—rational basis plus (Category 2) or strict scrutiny lite (Category 4)—is valuable not only for eliminating what is unnecessary, but also for providing a clearer focus on what remains.
The analysis provides the means for a more elegant system of tiers, one
that avoids doctrinal contortions. The analysis also helps to explain two
important and contested equal protection doctrines, affirmative action and
same-sex marriage. Although recognizing the central role that dimensionality plays in tiers of scrutiny analysis will not eliminate the Red Queen
Game, it might just allow lower courts to push ever so slightly ahead.
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APPENDIX: TIERS OF SCRUTINY CHEAT SHEET

Strict
Scrutiny

Tiers of Scrutiny Cheat Sheet
Actual
Comment
Test

Same

Benign

Race

Adverse

Doctrinal
Test

Strict
Scrutiny

Intermediate
Scrutiny

Illustrations

Due to Red
Queen game,
most laws adversely affecting
minorities no
longer take express form.

Jim Crow
laws

Although Court
formally applies
same test to benign and detrimental laws, this
is the one instance that forces
a dimensionality
split that would
distinguish illicit
and benign laws.
This could be accomplished using
intermediate scrutiny within two
dimension, or rational basis if benign and adverse
classifications
were treated
along separate
spectrums

Bakke;
Grutter;
Fisher II
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Same

Intermediate
Scrutiny

Strict
Scrutiny

Intermediate
Scrutiny

Rational
Basis
Scrutiny

Gender

Adverse

Strict
Scrutiny

Benign

Nondiscriminating/Subordinating
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Dimensionality
flattens when antidiscrimination is
eliminated, avoiding the central
normative position of modern
conservativism,
associated with
color blindness,
placing modern
liberals and modern conservatives
on the same side,
opposite Jim
Crow.

Loving

Although the
Court uses a single test—
intermediate scrutiny—to assess
gender-based distinctions, the test
does no work;
laws premised on
“overbroad”
characterizations
are functionally
subject to strict
scrutiny and cases
that are based on
real sex differences or that
overcome past
discrimination
against women
are functionally
subject to rational
basis review.

VMI illustrates judicial effort to
ratchet up
intermediate
scrutiny to
strike down
a law that
would otherwise likely
be sustained
based on real-sex differences.
Nguyen and
MoralesSantana illustrate laws
prioritizing
treatment of
mothers
over fathers
of foreignborn illegitimate children based
on real-sex
differences.

Adverse

Sexual Orientation
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Rational
Basis
Scrutiny
(Romer, Lawrence), or no
test
(Obergefell)

Strict
Scrutiny

Laws that distinguish gays and
lesbians for greater levels of difficulty in lawmaking or that single
out their intimate
conduct will be
invalidated based
on animus or an
understanding of
the essential role
intimate conduct
plays in forming
meaningful relationships, thus
benefitting society. Obergefell
avoided tiers to
avoid casting aspersions on those
who hold deeply
held religious or
moral views of
traditional marriage. (Thus far
we have no illustration of benign
laws challenged
under equal protection in this category).
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Romer;
Lawrence
(overturning
Bowers);
Obergefell
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